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vAbstract
The House of Representatives is, fundamentally, a majoritarian institution. A sim-
ple majority can do anything it wants, even changing the entire rules of the House
through the Constitutional provision that “Each House shall determine the Rules of
its Proceedings.” Despite this power, the House has maintained extensive parliamen-
tary rights for the minority party. This work examines why the majority may allow
the minority a continued role in lawmaking.
The historical development of the House rules is examined and compared to cur-
rent practices in the House. This leads to an understanding of how the House became
the institution it is today. The House rules evolved slowly over its first century, until
finally arriving at the surprisingly stable set of modern rules. Although some of the
changes the House has made appear strange at first sight, the models developed here
explain many of them.
Having identified key features of the rules of the House, a model of a legislature is
constructed. Consideration of bills can be described as endogenous agenda formation
– each action that the legislature takes is proposed by a legislator. This process
is modeled as a game, where the legislature’s rules describe an agenda tree. Even
minimal assumptions about the rationality of legislators provide predictions about
how bills will be modified by the amendment tree.
These floor consideration models, however, only predict what bills the legislature
will pass for a given set of rules. To understand how the rules of the House developed,
the modeled legislature is permitted to choose its rules (which amendment tree it will
use). If the bill has been exogenously identified, so the legislature is choosing a special
rule for the bill, the amendment tree it adopts will restrict the proposers. If the bill
vi
will be proposed endogenously, the legislature will adopt standing rules resembling
those of the House.
Further predictions are generated by combining this model with specific assump-
tions: depending on the type of issue being considered, certain rules should never
be adopted. This analysis suggests that the House generally does not consider one-
dimensional or distributive issues, but instead must deal with multi-faceted issues.
Committee: D. Roderick Kiewiet (chair), R. Michael Alvarez, Charles R. Plott, Kim C. Border
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1Chapter I
Theoretical Problems of
Democracy
Democratic systems must resolve several fundamental questions in order to operate
sensibly. These include both normative (“what should be”) and positive (“what can
be”) issues which directly concern the choices that a society must make. The core
normative issue is the balance between “liberalism” and “populism” (Riker 1982,
Dahl 1956). That is, majority rule (or popular sovereignty with equality) must be
balanced against minority rights (such as the “natural rights” of Locke or, more gen-
erally, the ability to pursue one’s own goals). Democratic republics are faced with
a more complex problem: maintaining this balance within and among all levels of
the government, the elected and the electorate alike. The Federalist Papers express
particular concern about the tyranny of the majority; Federalist 10 warns that “mea-
sures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice and the rights of the
minor party, but by the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority.”
These issues shape the initial balance of powers in the U.S. government, using an as-
sumption that no single faction will be large enough to control all the decision-making
institutions and cohesive enough to operate them in concert to impose its will.
Congress, with its central role in lawmaking, is critical to this design. Madison,
noting that “In republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predom-
inates” (Federalist 51), was particularly concerned with how to restrain a legislature
that usurps power. A key restraint is frequent elections: “it is particularly essential
2[to liberty] that the [House] should have an immediate dependence on, and an in-
timate sympathy with, the people. Frequent elections are unquestionably the only
policy by which this dependence and sympathy can be effectually secured” (Federalist
52). Federalist 58, however, cautions that legislative rules must maintain a balance,
avoiding both supermajority requirements and large legislatures dominated by a few
personalities.
During the 19th century, however, the Madisonian presumption that cohesive
majorities will not last was threatened, as large political parties with powerful leaders
had developed. Congressional institutions evolved in recognition of this changing
balance, under the control of the very political actors they were meant to limit.
Congressional history is filled with tales of partisan fights over the lawmaking process,
spanning thousands of pages of the Congressional Record.1 Usually, the minority party
claims some procedural right while the majority asserts it has the power and duty to
impose its will, often under a leader such as “Czar” Reed, “Uncle Joe” Cannon, or
Tom “The Hammer” DeLay.
In addition to the political debate, political scientists have also been discussing
this normative balance in the academic literature. While this discussion can be traced
through political-scientist politicians such as James Madison and Woodrow Wilson,
the latter half of the 20th century is of particular interest. In 1950, the Committee
on Political Parties of the American Political Science Association argued (along the
lines of Wilson, 1885) that the majority party was unable to exert as much control
over policy as it should.2 This was just one of many works during this era to study
the issue, however. Commager (1943, 4) draws a distinction between “the principle
that men make government and the principle that there are limits to the authority of
government.” Dahl (1956) discusses the underpinnings of this balance and considers
the American case. Riker (1982) continues the examination, looking at a collection
of anecdotes in a framework of abstract positive theories.
1See, for example, most of the Record for December 19, 1879, through March 2, 1880 (roughly
pages 200-1300) and the Roundtable Discussion on the Motion to Recommit (1992).
2APSA (1950, v): “either major party, when in power, is ill-equipped to organize its members in
the legislative and the executive branches into a government held together and guided by the party
program.”
3As Dahl, Riker, and Downs describe, normative concerns about balance or “fair-
ness” may be far less important than these positive political theories.3 Riker explains
that “not only may the results of voting fail to be fair, they may also fail to make
sense” (Riker 1982, 115). In 1785, the Marquis de Condorcet defined an apparently
reasonable criterion for a societal choice: the option chosen should be preferred to any
other option by a majority of the society. At the same time, however, he noted that
this “Condorcet winner” will not always exist. This troubling result was strengthened
by Arrow (1951), who proved that any method of societal choice must fail, in that it
must either be unfair or not be able to make a choice in every situation. Downs (1956,
67) identifies two general ways for a society to avoid these Arrow problems: consensus
on which issues are important or consensus on what options are best. Downs (1956)
and Black (1958) both use Hotelling’s (1929) model of economic competition along
a single dimension to model the political process.4 In this one-dimensional setting,
there is only one “issue” and thus society agrees on which issue is important, avoid-
ing Arrow’s problem. However, Black (1958, 138-139) notes that majority rule will
generally fail to make a choice in a two-dimensional setting with three voters.
Black’s observation was generalized by Plott (1967), who provided a proof that
majority rule will generically fail in a multi-dimensional setting. That is, for almost
any set of citizens’ preferences the society will find that there is no Condorcet winning
policy. Instead, there will be a cycle of choices where policy A defeats policy B, which
defeats policy C, and so on until some policy X defeats A. Further, even for a set of
preferences that actually generates a Condorcet winner, an arbitrarily small change
in one citizen’s preferences will create a cycle. Thus, in these cases society cannot
make a choice based only on the Condorcet criterion.
Schwartz (1972) argues that a particular generalization of the Condorcet crite-
rion is axiomatically reasonable and will always allow society to make a choice. In
particular, define the “top cycle set,” TC.(X).
5
3For example, Dahl (1956, 43), Riker (1982, 115), and Downs (1956, 62).
4See also Hotelling (1929, 54-55).
5O(a, P ) in Schwartz’ notation.
4Definition 1 Given a domain of objects X and a complete binary relation . on X,6
define the top cycle of . over X as
TC.(X) =
⋂
{C ⊂ X : C 6= ∅ and y 7 x ∀x ∈ C, y ∈ X \ C} (I.1)
That is, the top cycle is the smallest non-empty set where nothing outside the set has
the relation . to anything inside. TC.(X) has several useful properties:
• TC.(X) is non-empty and unique for every set X and preferences ..7
• TC.(X) is the Condorcet winner in X, if one exists.
• TC.(X) is the only set satisfying Schwartz’ (1972, 110-111) Conditions of Ra-
tionality for a choice set C ⊂ X:
Weak Dominance Nothing outside of C is .-preferred to anything in C.
Reducibility If a set A ⊂ X satisfies Weak Dominance, then some element of
A is in C.
Narrowness All strict subsets of C violate Weak Dominance or Reducibility.
It is also of interest to note that all elements of the top cycle are included in a single
.-cycle. That is, it is possible to label the points in the top cycle as TC.(X) =
{x1, x2, . . . , xn} such that x1 . x2 . . . . . xn . x1.8
While the top cycle is axiomatically reasonable, it is not clear how large the top
cycle actually is. Due to its connection with Condorcet winners, the top cycle is small
if a Condorcet winner exists. Thus, the top cycle can be informative. Given Plott’s
(1967) result, however, this result rarely applies. McKelvey (1976, 1979) shows that
the top cycle is actually “global” in many common applications if the Plott conditions
6. complete means that, ∀x, y ∈ X, either x . y or y . x (or both). Completeness provides for a
simpler definition (using intersections), since it generates a unique ⊂-smallest set. Schwartz achieves
uniqueness without using completeness by considering the union of the multiple ⊂-smallest sets.
7Assume that both C1 and C2 are members of the set in (I.1). Then C1 ∩ C2 is a potential
member. If C1 ∩ C2 = ∅, then x1 7 x2 and x2 7 x1, ∀x1 ∈ C1, x2 ∈ C2 – a contradiction with .
being complete. Thus, C1 ∩ C2 is a member of the set in (I.1).
8Assuming that the top cycle is finite.
5are not satisfied. That is, for most social choice problems either the top cycle is the
Condorcet winner or TC.(X) = X. Schofield (1978) shows a similar result, although
with somewhat more troubling implications.9
The McKelvey-Schofield results show that the top cycle should predict societal
choice, in a trivial sense. If there is a clear best outcome (that beats all other choices),
then it is the only element in the top cycle. If there is no clear winner, then the top
cycle predicts that the choice will be in the feasible set, X. This is not informative,
but it is correct. As McKelvey (1979, 1106) notes, “these results show the inadequacy
of arriving at any useful social choice functions using the notions of top cycle set . . . as
such methods will simply rank all alternatives as socially indifferent.” These results
are not quite as negative as they appear, however, as noted by the authors themselves.
“Of great importance is the process by which motions are proposed.
The decision process itself may dictate that some motions cannot be pro-
posed” (Plott 1967, 795).
“any attempts to construct positive descriptive theory of political pro-
cesses based on majority rule . . .must take account of particular institu-
tional features of these systems” (McKelvey 1979, 1106).
Farquharson (1969) demonstrates the effect that agenda has on voting outcomes,
even in the simplest settings. This research has been extended by many authors, re-
vealing how institutional structure (modeled as agendas) determines outcomes. These
authors generally posit that a group (committee, legislature, etc.) makes a decision
in an ordered way, following an “agenda.” For example, Shepsle (1979) considers
a “structure-induced equilibrium” where society considers issues one dimension at a
time (choosing the median policy on each). Many authors go further, assuming that
at each step the group votes to choose between two options (generating an agenda
9Both authors prove that a series of proposals may be offered that would lead from any point to
any other point in X. McKelvey (1976) constructs a finite sequence of proposals to move from a to
b such that b . xn . xn−1 . . . . . x1 . a. This might be interpreted as a malevolent agenda setter who
provides society with more-and-more extreme choices to obtain his ideal policy. Schofield (1978), on
the other hand, constructs a continuous path of proposals leading from a to b. This permits society
to meander, making arbitrarily small changes, to achieve any bad outcome.
6tree). A frequently used agenda tree provides that two specified policies are compared,
the winner is compared to a third policy, that winner is compared to a fourth, and so
on. Black (1958, 3, 21) refers to this as “ordinary committee procedure” or “proce-
dure (α)” while Farquharson (1969, 11) calls this “the usual method of procedure on
amendments.” Miller (1980) and Banks (1985), considering these amendment agen-
das, find that (if voters act “strategically,” voting for their most-preferred branch of
the amendment tree at each stage) the power of the agenda setter is reduced, but not
eliminated. Each author identifies a set of outcomes that could be chosen, eliminating
many options from the top cycle.10
McKelvey (1986) considers the effects of endogenous agenda formation, where
members of the legislature propose policies to be considered at each stage (prohibiting
overly-malevolent agenda setters). McKelvey finds that the equilibrium outcomes lie
in Miller’s uncovered set, but no smaller limit is identified. Banks and Gasmi (1987)
consider a particular example of a small committee using an endogenous agenda in
a two-dimensional spatial model and find that very few policies would actually be
proposed by members of the committee.11 Similarly, Baron and Ferejohn (1989)
consider a endogenous agenda model in a “divide-the-dollar” game, and are also able
to predict a small set of possible outcomes.12
Ordeshook and Schwartz (1987) point out a weakness of these analyses: the
“amendment agendas” considered by the previous authors are not necessarily repre-
sentative of real-world agendas. For example, the House of Representatives provides
for substitute amendments using a complicated agenda. First, the amendment must
be “perfected” using second-order amendments. Then that amendment is set aside
while a substitute (that would replace the amendment entirely) is perfected. Finally,
10McKelvey (1986) summarizes these, and similar, findings while providing a bound on how big
Miller’s uncovered set can be. Bianco, Jeliazkov, and Sened (2004) numerically calculate the size of
the uncovered set for several settings, showing that the set is far smaller than the entire space.
11In the two-dimensional spatial model, the committee is choosing a policy x ∈ R2 and each
committee member has preferences represented by a utility function based on the distance between
their “ideal point” and the chosen policy point.
12In the divide-the-dollar game, the n-member committee is choosing a policy x ∈ [0, 1]n under a
constraint that the sum of the elements of x is no more than 1. Committee member i’s preferences
depend only on xi and not on the other elements.
7the perfected amendment and perfected substitute are compared, with the winner
being compared to the bill. The second stage, where the perfected amendment is set
aside for a moment, prevents this from being an “amendment agenda.” Ordeshook
and Schwartz show that these more realistic agendas can result in a wide variety of
outcomes. Even if voters are strategic, an agenda setter can obtain any point in the
top cycle.
Miller (1995) provides an extensive review of these results and others, providing
a unified framework for consideration. In the end, however, Miller concludes that
exogenous agenda problems are largely solved, but endogenous agenda formation is
still a mystery.
“It is fair to say that [for binary voting under complete information]
the theory of committee voting is now largely complete . . . The major gap
lies in the area of agenda formation processes” (Miller 1995, 141).
Riker (1980) points out a more fundamental problem with all of this analysis. The
results show that outcomes are determined by institutions (agendas) as much as by
preferences. But the institutions themselves are determined by society – they are
chosen by some social choice process, subject to the same lack of clarity as the choice
over outcomes.
“If institutions are congealed tastes and if tastes lack equilibria, then
also do institutions, except for short-run events” (Riker 1980, 445).
This dissertation addresses the concerns of both Miller and Riker, as well as Or-
deshook and Schwartz. The main model, presented in Chapter III, considers a legis-
lature that is governed by Krehbiel’s “Majoritarian Postulate”:
“Objects of legislative choice in both the procedural and policy do-
mains must be chosen by a majority of the legislature” (Krehbiel 1991,
16).
The legislature chooses its rules, in that it chooses which particular agenda tree will
be used and who can make the (endogenous) proposals. The possible agenda trees
8will be based on the practices in the U.S. House of Representatives, but remain quite
general. Chapter II will review the current and historical practice of the House, with a
particular eye on the process of amending bills. After the main model is developed for
abstract preferences several special cases will be examined in Chapter IV. Chapter V
presents a similar model for the development of standing rules that predicts the
adoption of key features of the House rules. Collectively, the models predict that,
even in a majoritarian institution, there will be a role for the minority, supporting
Madison’s belief that (large) diverse republics will not exhibit cohesive majorities.
9Chapter II
Rules of the House of
Representatives
The U.S. House of Representatives is governed by a variety of rules. The most funda-
mental come from the Constitution, establishing the office of Speaker, defining that
the quorum to do business is a majority, requiring the publishing of a Journal, and
also requiring that (on the demand of one-fifth of the House) yea-and-nay votes be
recorded in that Journal.1 Finally, the Constitution established that
“Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings” (Article I, Sec-
tion 5).2
These self-determined rules are the main constraints on the day-to-day operation of
the House, although (when the rules fail to discuss a circumstance) the House will
also refer to “general parliamentary law” to figure out what should be done. In the
early years, this general law tended to be based on the experiences of the Continental
Congress and on England’s Lex Parliamentaria. In 1812, however, the House voted to
1These yea-and-nay votes, where the vote of each Representative is recorded separately, will be
referred to as “roll call” votes.
2It is amusing, if not actually useful, to note that the interpretation of this clause is not straight-
forward. In context, it appears that it is referring to each House of Congress so that the House and
Senate each determine their rules. The House has generally read this as referring to each House
of Representatives; see, for example, Hinds, §6744, p. 883, which discusses an incident where the
Speaker ruled: “The Chair overrules it on the ground that the Constitution clearly gives to each
House the right to adopt its own rules. Whatever may have been the rules or orders of a preceding
House in reference to this matter, they can not supersede the constitutional right of this House to
adopt its own rules.”
10
“annex” Thomas Jefferson’s Manual of Parliamentary Practice to the rules3 and in
1837 the House adopted a rule that theManual “shall govern the House in all cases to
which they are applicable, and in which they are not inconsistent with the standing
rules and orders of the House” (Journal, 1st Session, 25th Congress, September 15,
1837, pp. 62-63).
At the beginning of each Congress, the House adopts (by majority vote) new rules
for itself, providing structure for committees, debate, parliamentary motions, and
the operations of the House. These rules can also be amended by a majority of the
House in the middle of a two-year Congress, and it appears that this is when most
substantive changes have been applied. Further, the rulings of the Speaker (when
supported, tacitly or otherwise, by the House) have binding effect as “precedents,”
permitting additional mid-term changes in the rules. Although a House cannot impose
binding rules on its successors, its procedures do carry weight as general parliamentary
law.
As of the 108th Congress (2003-4), the main rules document fills nearly 1400
pages, and the precedents that lie behind those rules fill another 27 volumes.4 Even
the simplified roadmap to the rules and precedents, Brown and Johnson (2003), runs
1000 pages. Fortunately for this project, much of this deals with committees, con-
tested elections, and impeachment proceedings and thus does not directly address the
procedures of interest in this history.
1 Standing Rules
For most of its history, the House has used similar rules for consideration of bills by
the entire House. The Speaker runs the meeting, (unilaterally) recognizing members
to make motions. The valid motions (those that can be offered) are defined by the
3Journal, 1st Session, 12th Congress, February 28, 1812, p. 211. Jefferson’sManual was originally
written for the Senate, while he was Vice President and thus president of the Senate. It is still printed
in the House rules.
4The main rules document includes the Constitution, Manual, and the current House’s rules, as
well as brief commentary on the major precedents for each. The precedents volumes are Hinds’,
Cannon’s, and Dreschler’s Precedents.
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standing rules of the House. The House then votes on each motion, deciding to accept
or reject it by majority rule.
The set of valid “floor” motions has been essentially unchanged since the first
Congress, and reflect practice in the Continental Congress and many other legislative
bodies.
“10. While a question is before the house, no motion shall be re-
ceived, unless for an amendment, for the previous question, to postpone
the consideration of the main question, or to commit it” (Journals of the
Continental Congress, Vol. XI, May 26, 1778, p. 534).
“When a question is under debate, no motion shall be received, un-
less to amend it, to commit it, for the previous question, or to adjourn”
(Journal, 1st Session, 1st Congress, April 7, 1789, p. 9).
“4.(a) When a question is under debate, only the following motions
may be entertained (which shall have precedence in the following order):
(1) To adjourn. (2) To lay on the table. (3) For the previous question.
(4) To postpone to a day certain. (5) To refer. (6) To amend. (7) To
postpone indefinitely” (108th House Rules, 2003, Rule XVI.4, §911, p.
673).5
The House rules provide for four basic types of motions during consideration of a bill:
1. Motion to amend the bill,
2. Motion to stop debating and vote on the bill (previous question),
3. Motion to stop debating and assign the bill to a committee (commit, refer),
4. Motion to stop debating and do something else (adjourn, postpone, table).
1.1 Motion to Postpone
The motions to adjourn, postpone, and table have seen the most variation as to which
motions are in order. In the first Congress the only valid motion was the motion to
5This is also rule XVI.4 of most Houses since 1890, including all of the 54th through 109th Houses.
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adjourn (and dismiss the House for the day). In 1811, the list was expanded to its
current size: adjourn, table, postpone to a day certain, and postpone indefinitely.
The differences among these motions are somewhat subtle: a tabled bill will not be
considered again, an indefinitely-postponed bill may be considered again through the
usual methods, while a bill affected by adjournment or postponement to a day certain
will have high priority for consideration on that day.
The priority (or precedence) of these motions has changed occasionally, reflecting
dynamics in the House. For example, in the 1880s the House also allowed motions to
adjourn to a specified day or permit a recess with high priority. However, these were
mostly used for dilatory purposes (Hinds, §5302, p. 163), and hence a revision of the
rules in 1890 moved these to their current place, where they have the priority of a
motion to adjourn, if the Speaker chooses to recognize them.
Aside from their scheduling influence, however, it is unclear what policy implica-
tions these motions have.6 As such, these motions will not be considered further.
1.2 Motion to Commit or Refer
The motion to assign the bill to a committee is called by many names, including
refer, commit, and recommit.7 These motions provide that a specified committee
will consider the bill and report it back to the House with recommendations. The
House can also provide instructions to the committee: “amendatory” instructions
explicitly tell the committee how to rewrite the bill while “general” instructions are
more vague, telling the committee to hold hearings or to amend the bill to certain
ends. The committee can be a standing committee (established in the rules) or a
select committee (established for this particular purpose). The most important of
these committees, and the only one that has been a standing committee throughout
the history of the House, is the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the
Union.8 The COWH includes all members of the House and largely uses the rules
6Save for the motion to table, which permits the House to immediately reject a bill.
7These need to be distinguished from the identically-named motions that follow the previous
question, as described below.
8See Cooper (1970) for more details on the development of the standing committee system.
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of the House, but provides somewhat a more flexible debate environment and has a
smaller quorum. In the COWH, consideration of a bill occurs under the “five-minute
rule,” that a member recognized by the committee chairman may offer an amendment
and talk about it for only five minutes, followed by five minutes of discussion by a
member opposed, before the committee votes. The only other motion in order in
the COWH is a motion to rise and report to the House. If the COWH adopts
any amendments to the bill, then the House will consider whether to adopt these
amendments before continuing with consideration of the bill.
1.3 Motion for the Previous Question
The previous question motion is the only way to forcibly end debate in the House.9
As with the other motions during debate, this motion was inherited from the Conti-
nental Congress, which in turn derived it from the English Parliament. Both of those
assemblies would ask the question “should the main question be not now put?” and
(if a majority approved) the bill would be set aside for the day.10 If the previous
question did not pass in the Continental Congress, however, debate would continue
until no one wanted to speak. The first House, whose members generally had experi-
ence in the Continental Congress, reversed the question and asked “should the main
question be now put?” If the House rejected the question, debate would continue; if
the House accepted, however, things were unclear. In 1807, Speaker Varnum ruled
that the bill must immediately be voted upon; the House overruled him by a vote
of 103 to 14. In 1811, having learned his lesson, Speaker Varnum allowed debate to
continue after the previous question had been ordered; the House again overruled him
by a vote of 66 to 13.11 This later ruling thus established the correct way to read the
9The Senate, which has no previous question motion, currently uses cloture for this purpose.
Binder (1997) also discusses the development of the previous question during the 1800s.
10According to Jefferson (citing Hatsell), Parliament started using this in 1604 in the form “shall
the main question be put?” and, if rejected, the bill could not be considered again that session. See
Jefferson’s Manual, Section XXXIV, in 108th House Rules, §653, p. 241.
11Hinds, §5445, pp. 224-225; Journal, 1st Session, 10th Congress, December 15, 1807, pp. 79-80;
Journal, 3rd Session, 11th Congress, February 27, 1811, pp. 598-599. The latter vote apparently
occurred after 2:30 a.m., possibly explaining the low number of votes (Annals, 3rd Session, 11th
Congress, February 27, 1811, c. 1091).
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rule adopted by the first House: if enough members demand the previous question,12
the House will vote on whether to support the motion. If a majority supported the
demand for the previous question, the question of passing the bill (after the third
reading) or engrossing the bill (after the second reading) would be immediately voted
on, leaving the bill in its current form. All pending amendments and other motions
would be rejected with no debate and without a vote.
Despite repeated incidents where amendments were lost due to the previous ques-
tion, the House rejected several attempts to revise the rule over the succeeding
decades.13 By 1840, however, members of the 26th House had become sufficiently
unhappy with the blunt force applied by the previous question that the rule was
changed to read:
“The previous question shall be in this form, ‘Shall the main question
be now put?’ It shall only be admitted when demanded by a majority of
the members present, and its effects shall be to put an end to all debate,
and bring the House to a direct vote upon amendments reported by a
committee, if any, upon pending amendments, and then upon the main
question” (Journal, 1st Session, 26th Congress, January 14, 1840, p. 208).
In 1845, as part of the Texas admission debates, a motion was made to recommit the
bill with instructions to prohibit slavery. To end that debate, the previous question
was ordered. The Speaker called for a vote on the motion to recommit, but an
objection was made. The Speaker ultimately was overruled by the House,14 so that
the motion to recommit died without a vote. Hinds suggests that this incident led to
a revision of the previous question rule in 1848,15 so that it read
12Five members were required under the rules adopted in 1789; one-fifth of members present after
an amendment to the rule was adopted on December 23, 1811; a majority of members present after
a further amendment on February 24, 1812.
13See Hinds, §5446, pp. 226-227.
14The House first upheld the Speaker’s ruling, apparently by a voice vote. Then a motion to
reconsider was made, passing by a roll call vote of 99 to 93. The Speaker’s ruling was then rejected
in a new vote, apparently also a voice vote. See Journal, 1st Session, 29th Congress, December 16,
1845, pp. 111-113.
15Hinds, §5446, pp. 227-228.
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“. . . and bring the House to a direct vote upon a motion to commit,
if such motion shall have been made; and if this motion does not prevail,
then, upon amendments reported by a committee, if any; . . . ” (Journal,
1st Session, 30th Congress, August 5, 1848, p. 1164).
By 1860, the House had been stymied several more times by the abruptness of the
previous question. This led to the addition of even more complexity with a revision
of the relevant rule so that it read
“The previous question shall be in this form: ‘Shall the main question
be now put?’ It shall only be admitted when demanded by a majority of
the members present; and its effect shall be to put an end to all debate,
and to bring the House to a direct vote upon a motion to commit, if such
motion shall have been made; and if this motion does not prevail, then
upon amendments reported by a committee, if any; then upon pending
amendments, and then upon the main question; but its only effect, if a
motion to postpone is pending shall be to bring the House to a vote upon
such motion. Whenever the House shall refuse to order the main question,
the consideration of the subject shall be resumed as though no motion for
the previous question had been made. . . . The House may also, at any
time, on motion, seconded by a majority of the members present, close all
debate upon a pending amendment or an amendment thereto, and cause
the question to be put thereon, and this shall not preclude any further
amendment or debate upon the bill” (Journal, 1st Session, 36th Congress,
March 16, 1860, p. 530).
Although they were now exceedingly complicated, the rules concerning the pre-
vious question had been improved significantly. Hinds (1907) describes the previous
century’s development of the previous question as follows:
“In the earlier years its efficiency as a means of forwarding business
was accompanied by much harshness and rigidity, which not only worked
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hardship on the Member, but interfered with a convenient and satisfactory
disposal of business. In later years the harshness of the rule has been
considerably lessened, while it has been given greater flexibility, which has
enabled the House to follow its own wishes more fully in the consideration
of amendments and in dealing with incidental questions” (Hinds, §5443,
p. 222).
Much of this appears to have been true of other aspects of the House rules as well: the
rules had become very complicated, with vestigial bits throughout, but were facilitat-
ing lawmaking better that the 1789 rules had. To provide for further improvements,
the House undertook a major revision of the rules, clearing out a century of dead
wood.
1880: Major Rules Revision
On June 25, 1879, the House Rules Committee introduced a resolution requesting the
authority to sit during the summer recess, “for the purpose of revising, codifying, and
simplifying the rules of the House” (CR, June 25, 1879, p. 2328). When the House
returned in December, the Rules Committee presented their report and the House
agreed to “make it the special order for the 6th day of January, after the morning
hour, and from day to day until disposed of, to the exclusion of every other order”
(CR, December 19, 1879, p. 191).16
On January 6, 1880, general debate on the resolution began and the full report
of the Rules Committee was published. Although the report spans several pages of
the Congressional Record, with most emphasis on committees and their jurisdictions,
the sections that discuss the previous question are restricted to just a few pages. In
the report the committee explained the rationale for its proposed changes; for the
previous question they noted:
“The committee are of opinion that the operation of the previous ques-
tion should be modified in one respect, namely, that it should not be so
16Dion (1997, chapter 5) discusses these changes in some detail. The debates in the House fill
much of the Congressional Record for December 19, 1879 through March 2, 1880 (pp. 189-1267).
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sweeping and comprehensive as at present; and they accordingly recom-
mend that its effect shall be to bring the House to a direct vote upon the
immediate question or questions on which it has been ordered. It is there-
fore proposed that the previous question may be asked and ordered upon
a single motion, a series of motions in order under the rules, an amend-
ment or amendments, or may be made to embrace all authorized motions
or amendments, and its effect shall be to carry the bill to its engrossment
and third reading, and then, on renewal, to its passage or rejection. The
committee also propose that, pending a motion for or after the previous
question has been ordered on the passage of a bill, it shall be in order for
the Speaker to entertain and submit a motion to commit, with or without
instructions, to a standing or select committee, thus affording the amplest
opportunity to test the sense of the House as to whether or not the bill is
in the exact form it desires” (CR, January 6, 1880, p. 202).
General debate on the new rules continued for some days, until, despairing of
finishing the debate, the COWH began considering the rules under the five-minute
rule on January 27, 1880. After more than two weeks of lengthy debate on committee
jurisdictions and powers, on February 11 they finally reached rules XVI and XVII,
concerning floor procedures and the previous question. Rule XVI.4 received some
debate and an amendment,17 but both concerned whether the correct phrase is “to
lie on the table” or “to lay on the table.”
Rule XVII.1, establishing the previous question, saw slightly more action. Three
minor language amendments were made. This was followed by a question from Haskell
as to why the new rule seemed to include a trap for the unwary. Why are two motions
for the previous question required to move from the second reading to final passage?
Blackburn, speaking for the Rules Committee, explained the rationale for this two-
motion structure.
17This is the same rule XVI.4 that establishes the valid floor motions as discussed earlier. The
1880 version included motions to establish the day to which the House would adjourn and to recess
with similar precedence to the motion to adjourn.
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“after you have moved the previous question on a bill and any amend-
ments pending, and that previous question shall have been in operation,
and carried the bill to its engrossment and third reading, it may, and very
often does, occur that the House finds there is some amendment, some
discussion, some consideration which even the voting upon the bill under
the operation of the previous question has demonstrated to be necessary,
but there is no way of getting that amendment or that discussion unless
you go back and reconsider the several stages through which the bill has
gone, which would be very cumbersome. When the previous question on
engrossment and third reading is exhausted, the Chair always recognizes
the gentleman in charge of the measure to renew the demand for the previ-
ous question on the passage, and if then the House has not discovered any
hasty legislation or any mistake that has been made, the previous ques-
tion is again ordered, and carries the bill through to its passage” (CR,
February 11, 1880, p. 831).
This explanation was apparently not entirely credible, as the House allowed one pre-
vious question motion to do this job with a 1890 change in the rules. However, this
logic is very similar to that presented by Bach (in Roundtable, 1992), who suggests
that the post-previous-question motion to recommit may provide an escape (short of
killing the bill) following an “accidental” call for the previous question to passage.
Debate on rule XVII.1 continued on February 12th, with the action being con-
fined to another “lie/lay” amendment and a lengthy discussion on the never-ending
necessity of proofreading. Debate on the remaining rules continued through the 27th
of February, for a total of 14 days spent debating the new rules under the five minute
rule. On March 2, 1880, the COWH reported its amendments and the House adopted
the amended rules with a roll call vote. In the end, the House adopted the following
new rule governing the previous question:
Rule XVII.1: “There shall be a motion for the previous question,
which, being ordered by a majority of members present, if a quorum,
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shall have the effect to cut off all debate and bring the House to a di-
rect vote upon the immediate question or questions on which it has been
asked and ordered. The previous question may be asked and ordered
upon a single motion, a series of motions allowable under the rules, or an
amendment or amendments, or may be made to embrace all authorized
motions or amendments and include the bill to its engrossment and third
reading, and then, on renewal and second of said motion, to its passage
or rejection. It shall be in order, pending the motion for or after the pre-
vious question shall have been ordered on its passage, for the Speaker to
entertain and submit a motion to commit, with or without instructions,
to a standing or select committee” (CR, January 6, 1880, p. 206).18
Thus, in 1880 the previous question became an all-purpose motion to end discussion
on the House floor. It could be applied to any debatable motion, and to any bill or
resolution.
The new rules of 1880 also created an interesting new motion with a familiar
name. This post-previous-question motion to recommit is similar to the motion to
refer discussed earlier, except that it is available only at the last moment, immediately
before the House votes on whether to adopt or reject a bill. Since this motion (like
the ordinary motion to refer) can have instructions attached, it allows the House one
opportunity to fix a broken bill, and as such seems designed to improve the efficiency
(or perhaps accuracy) of lawmaking.
1891: Motion to Recommit Forthwith
This motion to recommit became truly important in early 1891 when a lame duck
congressman (with less than a week left in his term) offered a motion to recommit
with a novel instruction that the committee “report forthwith” his amendment. While
“Uncle Joe” Cannon had some power (even as he was on his way out), only one
member of the House had the power to completely change the process like this: the
18With amendments in CR, February 11, 1880, pp. 830-831, and February 12, 1880, p. 850.
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Speaker, at the time Thomas Reed, ruled that the motion was in order and, in
response to questions from the floor, explained his understanding of the motion:
The Speaker. The question now is on agreeing to the motion of the
gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Cannon], to recommit with the instructions
stated.
Mr. Springer. I wish to make a parliamentary inquiry. If the question
should be decided in the affirmative, Mr. Speaker, will it not require a
meeting of the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries in order to
report this bill back?
The Speaker. The Chair will not undertake to answer positively
that question without discussion; but there is a decision of one of his
predecessors which points out what seems to the present occupant of the
chair the true doctrine, though further discussion may change his opinion.
Mr. Breckinridge, of Kentucky. What was that decision?
The Speaker. That it would be the duty of the chairman of the com-
mittee to obey the order of the House and report the measure forthwith.
Mr. Springer. Without going to committee?
The Speaker. To report forthwith.
. . .
Mr. Farquhar. Did I understand the Chair to decide that if this
motion should be adopted the chairman of the Committee on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries [Farquhar himself] can report immediately to the
House?
. . .
Mr. Cutcheon. He could not do anything else under the instructions.
(CR, February 27, 1891, p. 3506)
A second important feature of Cannon’s motion to recommit with instructions to
report forthwith was that it would be immediately considered in the House without
being subject to rule or point of order that might send it to the COWH, where it would
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be subject to further amendment. After the House passed the motion, the chairman
of the instructed committee, in accordance with Cannon’s position, “immediately rose
in his place and announced that, as chairman of that committee, he reported back
the substitute bill as instructed by the House” (Hinds, §5545, p. 271).
Points of order were raised against almost every feature of Cannon’s motion.
Members objected to the fact that reporting “forthwith” meant that the committee
would not meet, that it would not authorize its chairman to report, that there would
be no written report, and that any changes ensuing in a bill should be reported
first to the Committee of the Whole. Others pointed out that in a legal context
“forthwith” means “within 24 hours,” and that one should specify “instanter” to
mean immediately (CR, February 27, 1891, pp. 3507-9).
Speaker Reed dismissed these objections.
“The rules of the House provide that after a bill has been ordered
to a third reading, that is, after it passes the amendment stage, then
the House has an opportunity to look at the bill as amended, and if not
satisfied with it, it has a right under the rules to recommit with specific
instructions. That is only another method of reconsidering its action. . . . it
might happen that an amendment was adopted by a majority composed
of one set of members, and another amendment adopted by a majority
composed of another set of members, and that the majority of the House
would not be in favor of both amendments together.
“It is to give opportunity to remedy this that the motion to recommit
is permitted. Now, the form which that takes is a peremptory instruction
on the part of the House to the committee to make that return, and it
seems to the Chair, after consideration of the matter, that it would be
adhering too much to technicalities to take the view entertained by the
gentleman from Georgia [Mr. Crisp],19 and it would seem to be more
suitable that the chairman of the committee should promptly obey the
orders of the House and follow its direction.
19Believing that the committee needs to actually meet (p. 3507).
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“The gentleman from Georgia is correct in saying that the chairman
of the committee is the mouthpiece of the committee, but the committee
itself is the agent of the House, and the House has a perfect right to order
the committee to do its will in whatever fashion it sees fit” (CR, February
27, 1891, p. 3508).
Reed also argued that a successful motion to recommit should not go back to the
COWH and should thus stand as the last amendatory stage:
“The whole subject, within the purview of the rules, has been consid-
ered by the Committee of the Whole, and the functions of that committee
have been performed. The Committee of the Whole has reported, and
the result thus far is that the House has disagreed with the Committee of
the Whole so pointedly, that it has substituted directly its own will for
the will of the Committee of the Whole, and, after considering the bill,
which had been ordered to a third reading, as amended, has directed the
committee in charge of this matter to bring back to the House ‘forthwith’
another bill. It seems to the Chair that that is a plain, logical system
for the transaction of business, and that it will justify itself thoroughly in
actual practice in the House” (CR, February 27, 1891, p. 3509).
The Speaker rejected all points of order; the House sustained his rulings and
ultimately passed the bill. Henceforth it has been in order, just prior to the vote
on passage of a bill, to offer a motion to recommit with instructions to report an
amendment forthwith. It was thus established as the final opportunity to alter a bill.
1909: A Minority Right
According to conventional wisdom, the new motion to recommit was another man-
ifestation of the efforts by congressional Republicans to centralize agenda-setting in
the House and to counter dilatory tactics on the part of the minority. For example,
Speaker Cannon noted (in 1910)20
20Having been reelected in 1892.
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“The interjection of the motion to refer after the previous question is
ordered is an anomalous proceeding, and in order only because of a special
provision of the rules. The object of this provision was, as the Chair has
always understood, that the motion should be made by one friendly to the
bill, for the purpose of giving one more [chance] to perfect it, as perchance
there might be some error that the House desired to correct” (Cannon,
§2762, p. 393).
In 1909, Representative Dalzell summarized the state of practice as follows:
“We all know that the motion to recommit, under existing practice,
has been used not to secure recommittal, but to prevent recommittal. The
custom has grown up to have a Member of the majority party move to
recommit and then to have his colleagues vote the motion down” (CR,
March 15, 1909, p. 31).
Representative Fitzgerald makes similar comments, concluding:
“Under our practice the motion to recommit might better be elimi-
nated from the rules altogether” (CR, March 15, 1909, p. 23).
While these contemporaries all described the value of the motion to recommit to
the majority party, they also agreed on the original intent of the motion. Dalzell
continued his summary by noting:
“Now, that is, without any doubt, an infringement of the rights of
parties who under the rules are understood and were intended to have the
right to test the sense of the House on a motion to recommit. (CR, March
15, 1909, p. 31)
While the rules themselves and the 1880 debates do not seem to support Dalzell’s
claim, he may have been referring to Joe Cannon’s comments in 1891. On the bill
that led to Reed’s ruling above, both George Fithian and Cannon wished to introduce
substitutes (amendments) for the bill (Fithian’s is at CR, February 27, 1891, p. 3501;
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Cannon’s at pp. 3504-5). However, only one substitute was permitted under the rules
for that bill. Cannon withdrew his substitute noting “I will withdraw my objection, in
the hope that I will be recognized to make a motion to recommit. I am opposed to the
present bill” (p. 3500). Recent analysis supports Dalzell and Cannon’s 1891 statement
– Wolfensberger (2004) finds that both Republican and Democratic speakers were
more likely to recognize minority- than majority-party members for offering motions
to recommit prior to 1909.
After decades in which the majority party consolidated its power, under Speakers
like Reed and Cannon, the minority party (and dissident members of the majority)
were agitating for change. There are even reports that the public cared about the
internal organization of the House, such as Brantley’s statement that a “hue and cry
that has gone out throughout the land against what is called ‘Cannonism’ ” (CR,
March 15, 1909, p. 29). Against this backdrop, the 61st House organized for busi-
ness in mid-March, 1909.21 Joseph Cannon, a Republican, was elected to his fourth
term as Speaker, but 12 members of his party voted against him. With the House’s
Constitutional office filled, the next order of business was to adopt the rules of its
proceedings – the standing rules. As per usual, the Republicans offered a resolu-
tion to adopt the rules of the 60th House and demanded the previous question. The
previous question was called, after a 193-189 vote. The rules resolution itself failed,
however, on a vote of 189-193. With no rules in place, the Democratic leader, Champ
Clark, introduced a resolution that would more extensively rewrite the previous rules,
including a provision to create a new Rules Committee (with six Democrats, five pro-
Cannon Republicans, and four anti-Cannon Republicans) with the responsibility to
completely rewrite the House rules over the summer. Clark then called for the pre-
vious question, blocking all amendments and almost all comments on his rules. This
previous question motion failed on a vote of 180-203, with a large group of (minority)
Democrats voting with Cannon and the Republicans.
With the failure of the previous question motion, the rules resolution was open
for amendments. Fitzgerald, a pro-Cannon Democrat from New York, introduced
21See, for example, Jones (1987, 166).
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a substitute (amendment) for Clark’s rules. Fitzgerald’s rules would keep almost
all of the 60th House’s rules, with two major exceptions: the legislative calendars
would be modified so that bills could reach the floor easier and the post-previous-
question motion to recommit would be guaranteed to a member opposed to the bill
(via constraints on the Speaker and the Rules Committee). After extensive debate
(including the quotes above), Fitzgerald’s rules were adopted on a vote of 211 to 173.
With these changes, the standing rules of the House provided the opposition with the
last amendment to each and every bill.
Rule XI: “The Committee on Rules shall not report any rule or order
. . . which shall operate to prevent the motion to recommit being made as
provided in paragraph 4 of Rule XVI.
. . .
Rule XVI.4: “After the previous question shall have been ordered on
the passage of a bill or joint resolution one motion to recommit shall be
in order, and the Speaker shall give preference in recognition for such
purpose to a Member who is opposed to the bill or joint resolution” (CR,
March 15, 1909, p. 22).
Evolution since 1909
The 1909 rule changes established that the post-previous-question motion to recommit
is a protected privilege of the opposition, and quickly this was interpreted as a “right”
of the minority party. As explained by Speaker Gillett in 1919, “a motion to recommit
is intended to give the minority one chance to express fully their views so long as they
are germane” (Quoted in Roundtable, 1992, p. 18). In 1992, Minority Leader Robert
Michel described the motion to recommit as:
“a motion to, in essence, offer [the Minority’s] alternative to what the
House has produced . . . it is both the first and last chance the Minority
has to look at the Majority bill as passed by the Committee of the Whole,
and to make recommendations for change” (Roundtable, 1992, pp. 87, 89).
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Of course, the only thing protecting these rules is their tacit acceptance by the
majority – as with all other rules of the House, a simple majority can change them.
In 1934, Speaker Rainey ruled that the Rules Committee could write a special rule
prohibiting all amendments (including amendatory motions to recommit) to partic-
ular sections of a bill. In the view that prevailed, the 1909 rules guaranteed only a
“straight” motion to recommit (without instructions). This ruling was rarely used
until the late 1970s, when the Rules Committee began limiting amendments more
severely. Wolfensberger (1992) reports that complete prohibitions of motions to
recommit with instructions appeared en masse in 1986,22 prompting extensive de-
bate in the decade that followed. By 1993, there had been at least eight more rulings
by the Speaker supporting the Rules Committee,23 and there had been a committee
hearing on the issue (the Roundtable Discussion on the Motion to Recommit).
Oddly, while these decisions undermined the rule that protected motions to recom-
mit (rule XI.4) other decisions were strengthening the motion to recommit itself
(in rule XVI.4). In 1989, a (minority) Republican was allowed to offer a post-
previous-question motion to commit the rules themselves, thus establishing that a
post-previous-question motion to (re)commit exists in general parliamentary law.24
This motion to commit was used against the rules at the beginning of every sub-
sequent House (through 2005). In general, these are motions to commit the rules
to a committee composed of the Majority and Minority Leaders, with amendatory
instructions to report forthwith.
1995: Reestablishment of a Minority Right
After winning control of the House in the 1994 elections, the Republicans were offered
their first chance in decades to amend the rules to their liking. The opening day of
that Congress, January 4, 1995, featured a novel strategy for adopting the rules:
22In particular, seven special rules stated that the motion to recommit “may not contain instruc-
tions” (Wolfensberger, 1992, 32). One rule like this was used in 1981, but Wolfensberger identifies
no others between 1977 and 1985.
23108th House Rules, §859, p. 631.
24108th House Rules, §60, p. 27, discussing Article I, section 5, of the Constitution. The Repre-
sentative making the motion was Mickey Edwards (R-OK), CR, January 3, 1989, p. 81.
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the House adopted a special rule that provided for structured debate followed by
separate votes on each section of the rules. The new rules significantly strengthened
rule XI.4(b), so that it read:
“The Committee on Rules shall not report any rule or order . . . which
would prevent the motion to recommit from being made as provided in
clause 4 of rule XVI, including a motion to recommit with instructions to
report back an amendment otherwise in order” (105th House Rules, Rule
XI.4(b), p. 520).
That is, except for amendments prohibited by the standing rules of the House (see
next section), any amendatory motion to recommit with instructions is in order.
The House has made one subsequent change to the rules, as part of a recodification
for the 106th House in 1999. The rules on the previous question and the motion to
recommit were renumbered and now are as follows.
Rule XIII.6(c)(2): “The Committee on Rules may not report . . . a rule
or order that would prevent the motion to recommit a bill or joint resolu-
tion from being made as provided in clause 2(b) of rule XIX, including a
motion to recommit with instructions to report back an amendment oth-
erwise in order, if offered by the Minority Leader or a designee.” (108th
House Rules, §857, pp. 627-628).
Rule XIX.1(a): “There shall be a motion for the previous question,
which, being ordered, shall have the effect of cutting off all debate and
bringing the House to a direct vote on the immediate question or questions
on which it has been ordered. . . . The previous question may be moved and
ordered on a single question, on a series of questions allowable under the
rules, or on an amendment or amendments, or may embrace all authorized
motions or amendments and include the bill or resolution to its passage,
adoption, or rejection” (§994, pp. 773-774).
Rule XIX.2(a): “After the previous question has been ordered on pas-
sage or adoption of a measure, or pending a motion to that end, it shall
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be in order to move that the House recommit (or commit, as the case
may be) the measure, with or without instructions, to a standing or select
committee. For such a motion to recommit, the Speaker shall give pref-
erence in recognition to a Member, Delegate, or Resident Commissioner
who is opposed to the measure” (§1001, pp. 777-778).
1.4 Motion to Amend
The motion for the previous question has importance mainly in that it ends the
amending process. Once the previous question motion has passed, the House is faced
with a simple choice among two alternatives: adopt the bill as it stands or reject
it and do nothing. Amendments are thus important in that they shape the final
bill, affecting policy in a direct manner. The first House, following the Continental
Congress, placed only one restriction on the motion to amend:
“No new motion or proposition shall be admitted, under color of
amendment, as a substitute for the motion or proposition under debate”
(Journal, 1st Session, 1st Congress, April 7, 1789, p. 10).
Hinds argues that this restriction was adopted by the Continental Congress for “ger-
maneness,” requiring that amendments address the topic currently under discussion.25
By the 10th Congress, this rule was interpreted as prohibiting “amendments in
the nature of a substitute.” That is, the rule prohibited amendments that proposed
to replace the entire text of a bill (or amendment) with new text. Thus, the early
Houses permitted only partial amendments.
It appears that these Houses permitted arbitrary-degree amendments, not just
amendments to bills and (second-order) amendments to those amendments. How-
ever, when the House incorporated Jefferson’s Manual into its rules, the depth of
amendments was restricted so that only first- and second-order amendments were
allowed.
25Hinds, §5753, p. 381.
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“if an amendment be moved to an amendment, it is admitted; but it
would not be admitted in another degree, to wit, to amend an amendment
to an amendment of a main question. This would lead to too much em-
barrassment. The line must be drawn somewhere, and usage has drawn
it after the amendment to the amendment” (Manual, Section XXXIII, in
108th House Rules, §454, p. 237).
Jefferson’sManual provided another restriction on amendments, although the text
there is generally inscrutable. Hinds has a clear statement of the principle, however.
“It is not in order to amend an amendment that has been agreed to”
(Hinds, §5763, p. 386).
Note carefully that this principle, on its own, prohibits Black’s (1958) “ordinary
committee procedure” for choosing among amendments. That form of agenda, where
two choices are compared, the winner is compared to a third, and so on, has generally
been assumed by political scientists, as described in Chapter I.26
The House chose to remove the prohibition on substitute amendments in 1822,
leaving just the “germaneness” portions of the rule from the first House:
“No motion or proposition on a subject different from that under con-
sideration, shall be admitted under color of amendment” (Journal, 1st
Session, 17th Congress, March 13, 1822, p. 351).
This established a quite reasonable procedure for considering bills: a bill is perfected
by a series of amendments one at a time, where each has been perfected by a series
of second-order amendments (considered one at a time).
By 1850, however, this system had evolved to the much more complicated modern
system. This system was codified in 1880 (along with many other rules changes),
and has survived into current usage. Many sources attempt to explain this process,
26Black’s procedure does seem applicable when comparing amendments of different degree, but
faced with two overlapping amendments of the same degree the House will first vote on whether to
take the first amendment or the bill, and then will vote on the second amendment only if the first
amendment loses. This is a variety of “sequential” or “sequential elimination” agenda, as described
by Ordeshook and Schwartz (1987, 182) or Miller (1995, 18).
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including Ordeshook and Schwartz (1987), Miller (1995), and Brown and Johnson
(2003). Beginning with a bill under consideration, the process proceeds as follows.
Up to four motions can be under consideration at one time (only one of each type).
• A motion to amend the bill (possibly replacing the entire bill “in the nature of
a substitute”).
• A motion to amend the amendment, as a second-order amendment.
• A motion to substitute an amendment for the amendment, where the substitute
amendment is germane to the amendment but replaces it in its entirety (and
thus is a first-order amendment).
• A motion to amend the substitute amendment, as a second-order amendment.
The House then proceeds to sort through these motions as follows and as depicted in
Figure II.1.27
1. The amendment is perfected, by considering amendments to the amendment
one at a time until no more are offered.
2. The substitute is perfected, by considering amendments to the substitute one
at a time until no more are offered.
3. The House votes on whether to accept the perfected substitute or retain the
perfected amendment. If the substitute fails, then another may be offered (and
perfected).
4. Once a substitute is accepted or the substitutes are exhausted, the House votes
on whether to adopt the resulting amendment or retain the bill.
27Weingast (1992, 154-155) discusses the 1983 Nuclear Freeze Resolution, which completely filled
the amendment tree, with Levitas proposing an amendment and Solarz proposing to amend the
amendment (which was rejected). Dicks then proposed a substitute, Hyde proposed to amend the
substitute, and Dicks (again) proposed to amend the amendment. As per the rules, the Dicks
amendment to the amendment was voted on (adopted), then the Hyde amendment to the substitute
was voted on (adopted), then the amended substitute was voted on (adopted), and finally the
substituted amendment was voted on (adopted by voice vote).
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Figure II.1: Stylized House amendment tree, with votes occurring in
numeric order. Adapted from Brown and Johnson (2003, 27).
Then, additional (non-overlapping) amendments can be proposed, one at a time, and
considered through this process.
The Committee of the Whole House (COWH) uses the same procedure, save that
at the end it is voting on whether to report the resulting amendment (and then the
House must vote on whether to adopt the COWH amendment).
A second-order amendment must be germane to the first-order amendment that it
amends, the substitute must be germane to the amendment, and the amendment must
be germane to the bill. In addition, all of these amendments need to satisfy all other
provisions of the House rules (such as the strict separation between appropriations
bills and legislative bills).
1.5 Motion to Reconsider
The House provides another motion that is relevant to the discussion. After a vote
has occurred, a member on the winning side may move to reconsider the vote. If a
majority of the House agrees, then the vote will be held again. If every member votes
accurately with perfect knowledge of the consequences, it seems that this motion is
pointless. However, it does provide an opportunity for any majority of the House
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to overturn a vote which went against them. The two-vote structure for COWH
amendments serves a similar purpose, providing the House with the ability to reverse
the outcome of a vote in the COWH. On occasion the House will vote against a
COWH amendment, usually when the amendment was adopted late at night and
thus some members may have been absent.28
1.6 Summary
The standing rules of the House evolved over the first century of Congress to pro-
vide reasonable opportunities to consider and amend bills, while first creating and
then prohibiting a variety of dilatory tactics. The rules now provide a wide variety
of amendment opportunities, a carefully-crafted mechanism to end debate and to
bring the bill to a vote, and even one final amendment opportunity before the House
adopts a bill. Further, while the rules do not require it, the Speaker (or Chairman of
COWH) usually alternates recognition on amendments and debate, providing for am-
ple opportunities for members of both the majority and minority parties to propose
amendments.
28For example, in July 1995 the House was considering HR 2099. Stokes (D-OH) proposed an
amendment to remove several riders that prohibited the EPA from enforcing the Clean Air and
Water Acts. On Friday the 28th (at about 1:30 p.m.), the COWH voted 212-206 (roll call 599) to
adopt the amendment. On Monday the 31st (at about 8:30 p.m.), the House voted 210-210 (roll call
605), rejecting the amendment. The major difference in the votes was that nine members who voted
“Yea” on Friday did not vote on Monday. (The Friday non-voters were evenly split on Monday, two
legislators changed their votes from No to Yea, and one changed from Yea to No.) Most Republicans
voted against the amendment, so this would have been another majority-party roll if the COWH
vote had stood.
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2 Procedures other than the Standing Rules
The standing rules of the House discuss two other issues of importance for this discus-
sion: how bills come to be considered on the floor and how to override the standing
rules. The standing rules establish several calendars, or lists, of bills that are awaiting
consideration. As part of the usual order of business, the House will consider the first
bill on a calendar before proceeding to the next. The standing rules also permit cer-
tain committees the privilege to report certain bills to the House in a manner where
they will be considered before all other bills on the calendar. The major committees
with the privilege (on their usual bills) are Appropriations, Budget, and Rules. In
the modern House there are also several ways around this process, overriding the
standing rules by unanimous consent, suspension of the rules, or a special order (or
special rule).
The motion to suspend or change the rules explicitly exists from 1794, when the
rules could be “rescinded” on one day’s notice, with a simple majority vote.29 In
1822 the threshold for suspension was raised to two-thirds of Members present, and
the motion was apparently used either to permanently change the rules or for delay,
rather than to call up bills out of the usual order.30
Hinds notes that by the 1830s the House was dealing with so much business
that the standing rules for the order of consideration had to be made rigid.31 This
inflexibility occasionally interfered with the consideration of an important bill, and so
something had to be done. The House began to use “special orders,” adopted either
by unanimous consent or under suspension of the rules, to bring important bills to
the floor out of order.32 Hinds provides examples from 1832, 1834, and 1836 where
29See Hinds, §6790, p. 902.
30This is inferred from various comments in Hinds, §6790, including the discussions on p. 903
about how rules were changed before the Rules Committee and n. 5 on p. 902 about delaying the
consideration of bills by extending the morning business.
31See, for example, Hinds, §3155, p. 193 (especially n. 5) and §6820, p. 915 (especially n. 5).
32Unanimous consent still is not completely enshrined in the rules, but it presumably has existed
from the earliest days of Congress. A member might ask unanimous consent to do something against
the rules, and if no one objects then everything is fine, if only because no one points out that it is
against the rules. Unanimous consent and suspension of the rules are different in that unanimous
consent can be granted only by the entire House, but at essentially any time, while suspension
requires only two-thirds of the House to approve, but (at this time) requires advance notice.
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the House agreed that a particular bill would be the afternoon business every day
until it was completed.33 By 1836, special orders were being used frequently, with
several dozen bills being considered in this manner.34
A special order is the most important tool that the House has to control its
schedule, because it allows the House to consider any bill in any calendar without
having to deal with all of the other bills first. With unanimous consent the House
could consider any bill at any time, but only if no one objected. Using suspension the
House could consider bills over some objections, but, as established in 1847, only on
particular days. Thus the House had its modern schedule management tools by 1880,
but it still had not created the truly powerful tools for controlling the amendment
process that dominate the modern House.
The most used limitation on the amendment process, the “motion to suspend the
rules and pass” a bill, was established in 1868.35 Hinds notes that this “established
the practice which now [1907] prevails almost entirely, of combining the motion to
suspend the rules with the motion to pass the bill” (Hinds, §6846, p. 925, n. 2). Such
a motion prevents all amendments to the bill and permits only 40 minutes of debate,
followed by a vote (requiring a two-thirds majority) to suspend the rules and pass the
bill. These motions still dominate the House, with several hundred bills so passing in
each Congress.36
At roughly the same time the Rules Committee was given the privilege to report
resolutions (relating to rules) at any time.37 Initially, since these resolutions changed
33Hinds, §3155-3157, pp. 193-194.
34Hinds, §3158, p. 194, who points to Journal, 1st Session, 24th Congress, p. 1347 (the entry for
“Order of business, special arrangement of” in the index). There are 54 separate pages cited.
35As part of the impeachment of President Andrew Johnson, a member moved to suspend the
rules and adopt a just-introduced resolution. The motion was adopted and the resolution became
effective, providing a special order for the consideration of impeachment. Journal, 2nd Session, 40th
Congress, February 25, 1868, pp. 407-408.
36For example, Oleszek (2004, 117), Table 4-2.
37This history is particularly complicated. It appears that the “Select Committee on Rules”
was created and given this power at the beginning of most, if not all, Congresses from the 1850s
through 1880. See Hinds, §4650, p. 967, and §4321, p. 835, n. 1. In the 1880 rules revision the
committee became a standing (permanent) committee, although privilege was still granted term-by-
term (see, for example, Speaker Keifer’s comments in Hinds, §3160, p. 195). By 1889 this privilege
was considered “the uniform practice of the House” (Hinds, §4622, p. 952, n. 5). In 1891 the privilege
to report at any time was made permanent (Hinds, §4321, p. 835).
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the rules, a two-thirds majority was required to adopt a special order from the Rules
Committee. However, in 1883 the Rules Committee reported a resolution that would
permit the House to suspend the rules and consider a particular bill by majority vote.
After a point of order was raised, Speaker Keifer issued a rambling ruling, including:
“a rule might have been reported from the committee, and properly,
which would suspend or repeal or annul or set aside every rule of this
House, standing or special; and if the House so decided to affirm that
report by a majority vote it could do so” (Quoted in Hinds, §3160, p.
195).
Twenty years later, in 1902, Speaker Henderson made a slightly more explicit ruling
to a similar point of order:
“The question has been fought out again and again, and is well settled
that the Committee on Rules can bring in a rule providing for order of
business in the [House]. . . . There have been many decisions that a rule
from the Committee on Rules which fixes the order of business with the
approval of the House does not require a two-thirds vote” (Quoted in
Hinds, §3169, p. 198).
Thus by the early 1900s it was firmly established that the Rules Committee could
offer a special order that would require the approval of only a simple majority of the
House.
The remaining piece of the amendment-control structures of the House is the “spe-
cial rule,” which not only brings a bill under consideration but limits what amend-
ments can be offered. Aside from motions to suspend the rules and pass (which
prohibit all amendments), special rules appear to have emerged in the 1880s. The
1883 example referenced above (with Keifer’s ruling) appears to be a “closed” rule,
prohibiting all amendments.38 In 1889 the House considered a “modified closed” rule,
38Hinds, §3160, pp. 194-5.
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providing for only two amendments,39 and in 1893 the House considered a “struc-
tured” rule, providing for six amendments to be considered in a particular order.40
Thus, by the late 1800s all of the modern facilities for considering bills were in
use. This includes, in particular, five methods for bringing a bill to the floor and
three major categories of special rules.41
Unanimous Consent All members of the House choose to set aside all rules and
immediately pass the bill as it stands.
Suspension of the Rules Two-thirds of the House choose to set aside all rules and
pass the bill (after some debate).
Privileged Matter A few committees, such as Appropriations, have the authority
to report bills to the House directly. These bills are considered quickly under
the standing rules of the House.
Special Rule The Rules Committee can write a “special rule” for any bill (adopted
by a simple majority) that sets aside some rules of the House and provides
for consideration of a bill. Most special rules are open (allowing most amend-
ments), “structured” (allowing only specified amendments), or closed (allowing
no amendments).
Calendars If no one looks favorably on a bill, it can still come before the House off
of several legislative calendars, to be considered under the standing rules of the
House. Of course, calendar bills have very low priority and are almost never
considered.
39Hinds, §3210, p. 216.
40Hinds, §3204, p. 213. See Chapter III for details on this rule for considering a “free silver” bill.
41The House is regularly developing novel special rules for considering bills, but most fall into
the major categories. See the “Survey of Activities of the House Committee on Rules” from any
recent Congress. For example, the (minority) “Additional Views” section for the 104th House (104th
Survey, pp. 139-179) describes several inventive rules from 1995-6, including a new interpretation of
time caps and the “most-votes-wins” procedure.
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Unanimous Consent 29%
Suspension of the Rules 38%
Privileged Matter 21%
Special Rule 8%
Private Calendar 3%
Consent Calendar 1%
D.C. Calendar 0%
Table II.1: Methods for considering bills, 1983-1994, from Cox, Den
Hartog, and McCubbins 2004, Figure 1.
2.1 Floor Consideration in the Modern House
Developing a theoretical model of the House rules for floor consideration, as spelled
out above, may seem like a reasonable approach to understanding the balance of power
in the House. However, a detailed analysis of how the House actually considers bills
will reveal which rules are actually used in the modern House, potentially permitting
a simpler model, without the unused rules.42
Cox, Den Hartog, and McCubbins (2004, Figure 1, citing Oleszek 1996) classify
bills based on how they reach the floor, for the last six Democratic Congresses (1983-
1994), as reported in Table II.1. They find that most bills are considered using
supermajority methods that prohibit amendments (namely, unanimous consent and
suspension). The remaining bills tend to either be privileged matter or have a special
rule.
2.2 Usage of Special Rules
Continuing this analysis to the recent Republican House reveals a subtle problem,
however.43 The 104th Congress considered over 6500 bills and the 106th considered
nearly 9000. Due to this sheer number of bills, some method of identifying “impor-
42It is important to note that this approach may miss a parliamentary motion that is usually
threatened, but rarely used because bills are changed in anticipation of the motion. (See Cameron’s
anticipation model of vetoes, 2000, 84-86.) An examination of the debates surrounding each bill
(and rule) should identify any on-the-record threats, minimizing this risk.
43This section focuses on two similar Houses, the 104th (1995-1996) and 106th (1999-2000). Both
were elected in non-presidential elections; both had Republican majorities (about 230-200 in the
104th and 220-210 in the 106th) and first-term Speakers (Gingrich and Hastert); and both were
facing President Clinton and a comfortably Republican Senate (around 55-45).
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How CQ Picks Key Votes
Since 1945, Congressional Quarterly has selected a series
of key votes on major issues of the year.
An issue is judged by the extent to which it represents:
• A matter of major controversy.
• A matter of presidential or political power.
• A matter of potentially great impact on the nation and
lives of Americans.
For each group of related votes on an issue, one key vote
usually is chosen – one that, in the opinion of CQ editors,
was most important in determining the outcome.
Figure II.2: Definition of a key vote, CQ Almanac, 1995 p. C-36.
tant” bills is needed in order to perform a detailed analysis of the actual procedures
used in the House. “Bills that become law” fail as being both too inclusive and too
exclusive.44 However, each year Congressional Quarterly picks a few dozen roll call
votes as “key votes” that they feel are important. They describe the process each
year with a summary in their Almanac, as in Figure II.2.
There were 64 key votes during the 104th Congress (1995-6) and 50 during the
106th (1999-2000). These votes are associated with 47 different bills (41 not directly
related) in the 104th, and 44 different bills (38) in the 106th. Table II.2 presents the
distribution of key votes to types of bills for these two Republican Houses.
The bills and joint resolutions become law if agreed to (in identical form) by
both the House and Senate and signed by the President.45 As part of this agreeing
process, two (or more) bills are sometimes combined into one. Considering key vote
bills that were brought together in the legislative process leads to a list of 34 items
that reached the floor of the 104th House and another 34 for the 106th House. The
44333 bills became law in the 104th Congress and 580 in the 106th. However, there was little
doubt that some of these bills were destined to become law. For example, Public Law 104-3, allowing
Korean War veterans to join the Veterans of Foreign Wars, passed both the Senate and House by
unanimous consent. On the other hand, some important and controversial bills did not become law.
45Concurrent Resolutions require both houses, but not the President to be effective. A House
Resolution requires only the House to approve, but has no effect outside the House (these are
usually used to provide special rules).
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104th 106th
House of Representatives Bill HR 26 26
House Joint Resolution HJR 3 0
House Concurrent Resolution HCR 0 1
House Resolution HRes 1 0
Senate Bill S 14 14
Senate Joint Resolution SJR 1 0
Senate Concurrent Resolution SCR 1 1
Senate-Only Matter1 1 2
1 Nominations, treaties, and impeachment trials.
Table II.2: Classification of bills directly involved in key votes.
104th 106th
Became Law 17 15
Vetoed (not overridden) 7 5
Died in Conference Committee 0 3
Died in Senate (after House) 7 10
Died on House Floor 1 0
Resolution adopted 2 1
Died in House before Floor 1 1
Died in Senate (before House) 5 1
Senate-Only Matter 1 2
Table II.3: Final outcomes of key vote bills. (Those above the line were
considered by the House and will be considered further here.)
ultimate outcomes of these bills are summarized in Table II.3.
For each of the issues that reached the House floor, legislative histories were con-
sulted in order to identify its first consideration by the House, as reported in the
appendix to this chapter (in Tables II.9 and II.10). With one exception in each
Congress, the House considered a House (as opposed to Senate) measure on each is-
sue. Even if the House measure was created by simply re-labeling a bill passed by the
Senate, there was a distinct point when the bill was reported by a House committee
for consideration on the floor. At that time, the House Rules Committee generally
wrote a “special rule” (in the form of a House Resolution) providing for expedited
consideration of the bill. These special rules and subsequent floor activity form the
basis for the analysis in this section. The rules used are summarized in Table II.4.
The House Committee on Rules publishes a biannual Survey of Activities that
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All Bills KV Bills
104th 106th 104th 106th
Suspension of the Rules 401 893 2 3
Open 80 93 7 5
Open Rule & UC Time Cap n/a n/a 1 0
Open Rule & UC Structured n/a n/a 1 2
Structured 43 52 21 17
Closed 22 39 2 7
Table II.4: Special rules used to consider key vote bills. (“All Bills”
data from Oleszek (2004), 104th Survey, and 106th Survey.)
describes the major categories of rules:46
Open Rule These allow any member to offer any amendment that would be in order
under the standing rules of the House (e.g., germane amendments). These
may be modified with either a time cap, limiting the total time available for
consideration of amendments, or a preprinting requirement that amendments
be printed in the Congressional Record before being offered.
Structured These rules state that only amendments printed in the associated Rules
Committee report are in order, and only in the order listed.47
Closed These rules prohibit all amendments to the bill. Sometimes this is done
explicitly, but other times the rule states that the bill is considered in the
House with the previous question already ordered (hence blocking all motions).
In addition, many rules provide for special treatment of committee amendments
(and other amendments chosen by the Rules Committee), such as being considered as
“original text” (so they can be amended further) or being automatically considered
as adopted. Many rules also waive various rules of the House, blocking many points
46The House can also provide for expedited consideration without using the Rules Committee. By
2/3-majority vote, the House can choose to immediately consider a bill, without any amendments, on
selected days, with a motion to “suspend the rules.” By unanimous consent, the House can choose
any special order, even overriding an existing special rule. But see Brown and Johnson (2003,
865-867, 889-890) discussing modifying special orders and limiting unanimous consent requests.
47The Rules Committee defines “modified closed” rules as those that provide for only one or two
amendments, while “structured” rules provide for more, although the terminology is often mixed in
academic literature. Throughout this section, “structured” will be used to include both those rules
with few amendments and those with many.
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94th 95th 96th 97th 98th 99th 104th 106th
Open Rule 63.6 70.6 52.0 23.5 31.8 13.6 21.9 19.3%
Restrictive 31.8 23.5 40.0 64.7 63.6 72.7 71.9 58.0%
Closed Rule 4.5 5.9 8.0 11.8 4.5 13.6 6.3 22.6%
Table II.5: Types of special rules used for key vote bills (adapted from
Bach and Smith 1988, 57, Table 3-3).
of order during consideration of budget and appropriations bills.48 Note that there
are four instances in this data where the House adopted an open rule for a key vote
bill, but then later adopted a more restrictive special order by unanimous consent.
From Table II.4, it is readily apparent that the important key vote bills were
much better protected from amendment than typical bills. Further, few key vote bills
passed under suspension of the rules. Many bills with structured rules were key vote
bills, but few bills considered under any other type of rule were as important.
Bach and Smith (1988) also examine bills that received key votes, presenting the
frequency of special rules for these bills in their Table 3-3.49 Table II.5 adds the 104th
and 106th Houses to their table. It appears that these Congresses are comparable to
the early 1980s Congresses (97th-99th), but not to those of the late 1970s.
It is perhaps of interest to note how rules relate to the final disposition of key
vote bills. Table II.6 categorizes the regular bills which eventually were associated
with a key vote.50 It appears that open rule bills may be more likely to become
law, especially in the 106th House, but sample sizes are too small to find statistical
significance.
48Neither of these details is considered further here, but these features do generally have the effect
of increasing the power of the majority party and the Rules Committee.
49It appears that their definition of a key vote bill differs slightly from that used here. From a
brief examination of the 99th Congress, it appears that they include only bills which had a CQ key
vote in the House, while this section examines those items, plus those that had a key vote in the
Senate (where a connected bill could be identified in the House). Thus, they include roughly 20 bills
per Congress, while this section uses 34 in each.
50Four issues in the 104th and one in the 106th were not potential laws; instead they would become
effective in other manners. Two of the House Joint Resolutions were Constitutional amendments;
one missed the 2/3 threshold in the House and the other missed 2/3 in the Senate. One Concur-
rent Resolution and one House Resolution were adopted (becoming effective without requiring the
President’s signature). All four were considered under structured rules. In addition, one Concur-
rent Resolution in the 106th was adopted (using a structured rule). (The remaining Concurrent
Resolution in that House shared a rule with a House bill, and is included in Table II.6.)
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104th 106th
Law Fail Law Fail
Suspension 2 0 1 2
Open Rule 5 3 5 0
Structured 9 9 7 11
Closed Rule 1 1 2 5
Table II.6: Outcome versus special rule for key vote bills.
2.3 Amendment Structure
For each of the key vote bills described above, the debate in the Congressional Record,
the special rule, and the report of the Rules Committee were consulted to identify all
offered amendments, including their contents, offeror, and ultimate resolution. Some
of this data is summarized in the appendix to this chapter (in Tables II.9 and II.10).
Examining the amendments made in order (and those offered) on key vote bills,
it appears that a typical bill is effectively considered under a “sequential-elimination
agenda” as defined by Ordeshook and Schwartz (1987). That is, each amendment is
completely resolved before another can be proposed. Further, once an amendment is
agreed to it stays in place. While many amendments are typically offered to each bill,
it is rare that they overlap in content. There were very few second-order or substitute
amendments, and even those amendment trees remained fairly simple.
The most complicated example of interrelated amendments occurred in the 104th
House on HR 925 (which was later incorporated into HR 9). The modified open
rule provided that the first amendment to be considered was an amendment in the
nature of a substitute (i.e., a replacement bill) by Canady providing, among other
things, a limit on regulatory “takings” of 10% of the value of the protected part of
a property. Goss offered a second-order amendment (to change that to 30% of the
value of the entire property), which was barely rejected (210-211). Mineta proposed
a limit of 20% of the total value, which was handily rejected (165-260). Finally,
after extensive discussion, Goss proposed a limit of 20% of the protected part, which
was overwhelmingly agreed to (338-83).51 Canady’s substitute was the first-order
51The amended version of Canady’s amendment was then adopted by voice vote in both the
COWH and the House.
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amendment to the bill, so everything else was a second-order amendment. Since
third-order amendments are never in order in the House, this means that even this
complicated amendment tree looks largely like a sequential-elimination agenda.
2.4 Failures of Majority Power
The previous sections reveal that the House truly is a majoritarian institution, where
a simple majority should be able to do what it wishes. However, there is a natural
majority (the larger party) who controls rule-making through both the Speaker of
the House and a disproportionate share on the Rules Committee. As Dennis Hastert,
Speaker of the House in the 106th Congress, has explained
“Unlike some other parliamentary bodies, the Speaker in the U.S.
House of Representatives is the leader of his party. He is not merely
a disinterested arbiter of parliamentary rules. . . . But while we strive to
be fair, we also strive to get the job done. We are not the Senate. The
rules of the House, while they protect the rights of the minority, also in-
sure that the will of the majority of the House will prevail. . . . The job of
Speaker is not to expedite legislation that runs counter to the wishes of
the majority of his majority” (Speaker Hastert in The Changing Nature
of the Speakership, pp. 61-62).
Hastert proceeds to provide an anecdote of how he has used his scheduling and rule-
making powers,52 justifying it by explaining that he had two points to prove:
“First, I wanted my troops to know I opposed the bill. Second, I
wanted to let them know that I had no choice but to schedule the legisla-
tion. I was not going to abandon my party’s position under any circum-
stances.” (Speakership, p. 62)
52As Hastert explains it, a coalition of (minority) Democrats and some Republicans were forced
to go through the nearly-impossible committee discharge process twice to bring a campaign finance
reform bill to the floor. See Speakership, p. 62. He also makes an oblique reference to holding roll
call votes open (beyond their usual 15 minutes, which the Speaker can do unilaterally) while the
Republican leadership convinced members to vote with the party.
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The history of the key vote bills can be used to examine how often the Speaker fails
to protect his party.
Since a roll call vote associates a “yea” or “nay” with every member of the House,
it is possible to identify the amendments and bills where most of the (majority)
Republicans voted against the issue, but it passed anyway. These events, often called
“majority rolls,” reveal times when the Speaker and the rules of the House failed to
protect the majority party. The majority is not rolled on every bill, but they lost
22 votes (on 16 of the 68 key vote bills), including losing the final passage votes on
five. Twelve of the bills were considered under structured or closed rules, so the Rules
Committee and House explicitly permitted the amendment (or bill) that rolled the
majority.
A review of the issues covered by the majority rolls includes a number of politically
divisive issues, as summarized in Table II.7. Half of the bills became law and another
three passed both the House and Senate, so there is significant potential for these
issues to actually change policy.53
Voting Patterns on Majority Rolls
These majority roll votes can be used to construct a “loyalty” score based on how
often a particular representative voted with Democrats and against the Republicans.
Meaningful scores can be developed for most members, save for the Speaker and a
few members who missed many votes.54
The loyalty scores are distributed as reported in Figures II.3 and II.4.55 A score of
53It is possible that some of these amendments were removed even on the bills that became law.
A parallel model to Van Houweling (2003) could have the Republicans being rolled in the House yet
removing the amendment in the conference committee (where the action is less visible).
54For the 104th, the representatives who missed half of the majority roll votes were Campbell
(R-CA), Millender-McDonald (D-CA), Reynolds (D-IL), Jackson (D-IL), and Cummings (D-MD).
For the 106th, they were George Brown (D-CA), Livingston (R-LA), and Vento (D-MN). All of
these representatives served only partial terms. In addition, Speaker Gingrich (104th) never voted
on these issues. Speaker Hastert (106th) voted on five of the majority roll votes, including voting
with the Democrats on the amendment to HR 1401, the Yugoslavia peacekeeping vote.
55Independents and party-switchers are not included in these Figures. The independent member is
Sanders (I-VT) (with scores of 10 in the 104th and 8 in the 106th). The party-switchers in the 104th
are Deal (D/R-GA), Tauzin (D/R-LA), Hayes (D/R-LA), Parker (D/R-MS), and Laughlin (D/R-
TX), all switching from Democrats to Republicans. In the 106th the party-switchers are Forbes
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Majority Rolls in the 104th House
Bill $5.15 minimum wage (HR 1227)
Amend TV station ownership limits
Amend Require V-chip in TVs
Amend $5.15 minimum wage
Amend Remove new immigration restrictions
Amend Require Cong. hearings before funding tritium production
Amend Reduce forces in Europe unless NATO contributes
Amend Allow product liability suits against foreign manufacturers
Amend Lower teenage drunk driving limits (tie to highway funds)
Amend Restore a Clean Water Act program
Majority Rolls in the 106th House
Bill Campaign finance reform (HR 417)
Bill Steel import limits (HR 975)
Bill $6.15 minimum wage (HR 3846)
Bill HMO reform (HR 2723)
Amend Allow Defense funds to be spent on Yugoslavia peacekeeping
Amend Reduce funding for Amtrak Reform Council by 40%
Amend $6.15 minimum wage
Amend Give Vieques Island to Puerto Rico
Amend Protect funds for new National Monuments
Amend $20M for National Endowments for Arts and Humanities
Amend $155M for international debt relief
Amend $42M for AIDS research
Table II.7: Majority-party rolls on key vote bills.
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Democrats
Loyalty Score10 0
66 62
35
17
8 4 4 1 1 0 0
Republicans
Loyalty Score10 0
0 3
8 9
17 21
28
34 33
42
34
Figure II.3: Distribution of loyalty scores, by party, 104th House.
Democrats
Loyalty Score12 0
129
42
20
5 7 2 2 0 1 0 1 0 0
Republicans
Loyalty Score12 0
1 0 3
7 8 10 11
15
23 26
43 46
28
Figure II.4: Distribution of loyalty scores, by party, 106th House.
0 means that the Representative always voted with the Republicans on the majority
roll votes. A high score indicates many votes with the Democrats on these votes. The
maximum possible score is 10 in the 104th and 12 in the 106th.56
Note that the modal Republican defects from the party once, while the modal
Democrat never defects. More importantly, the median Republican defects three
times in the 104th or two times in the 106th. The median Democrat defects once in
the 104th and never in the 106th. Although party asymmetries cannot be considered
significant,57 it appears that discipline among the Democrats is much stronger during
the 106th Congress than during the 104th. This occurs despite the increase in size
(R/D-NY, score 6) and Goode (D/I-VA, score 0). This does not include Martinez (D/R-CA), who
switched after all majority roll votes in the 106th Congress. Martinez is listed with the Democrats
and has a fairly-loyal score of 9.
56The outliers are as follows. In the 104th House: Republicans with 9 are Morella (R-MD),
Boehlert (R-NY), and Forbes (R-NY); Democrat with 2 is Hall (D-TX); Democrat with 3 is Stenholm
(D-TX). In the 106th House: Republican with 12 is Boehlert (R-NY); Republicans with 10 are
Morella (R-MD), Kelly (R-NY), and Gilman (R-NY); Democrat with 2 is Hall (D-TX); Democrat
with 4 is Pickett (D-VA).
57Since the selected votes were majority-party rolls, one must expect that Republicans will appear
to be less loyal than Democrats.
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of the minority by ten, which decreases the number of (net) defectors required to roll
the Republicans.58
The pattern of loyalty among Republicans is surprisingly similar for both Con-
gresses. Over 85% of Republicans vote against the party at least once, but fewer than
10% defect on more than six of the majority roll votes. It should be noted, however,
that the distribution of Republican loyalty cannot be derived from a one-dimensional
model, where moderate Republicans are the first to defect. There is not a large core
group of Republicans who defect on most votes. Further, it seems unlikely that even
a two-dimensional model will adequately explain the diverse groups that are defect-
ing. For example, consider the votes on the four bills in the 106th House where the
Republicans were rolled. Every possible combination of votes on these bills was cast
by some Republican, as noted in Table II.8. This likely requires that the Republicans’
preferences differ on at least three dimensions, more than are usually used to explain
Congressional behavior.59
The “Hastert doctrine,” as named by the New York Times,60 requires that the
Speaker protect the majority of the majority party over all others in the House. In
the 106th House, however, a majority of the Republicans did vote against several
bills and amendments only to be defeated – a clear violation of the doctrine. Newt
Gingrich, four years earlier, protected the Republicans from most Democratic bills,
but the party was still rolled on a number of amendments. To this extent, it appears
that the Hastert doctrine was not in effect in the late 1990s.
Further, the bills and amendments that split the Republicans did so very deeply.
These losses were not a simple matter of a few moderates working with the Democrats.
Over 85% of Republicans voted to defeat the party at some point, including Hastert,
Tom DeLay, and Dick Armey. In addition, in most cases, almost all Republicans
58However, Aldrich (1995, 213) argues that parties that are closer to minimal-winning size will be
more cohesive, as “there is increasing potential for the intralegislative rules of the party to achieve
something that [members] alone would not obtain.”
59E.g., Poole and Rosenthal (1997) and most anyone who uses NOMINATE or other ideal point
estimates for Congress.
60“The Speaker Who Would Be Maitre D’ ”, New York Times, December 2, 2004, p. A38, dis-
cussing Hastert’s comments in The Changing Nature of the Speakership.
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HR 975 HR 417 HR 2723 HR 3846 #Dem #Rep
Y Y Y Y 176 17
Y Y Y N 4 4
Y Y N Y 0 6
Y N Y Y 9 8
N Y Y Y 10 9
Y Y N N 0 1
N Y Y N 0 1
N N Y Y 1 4
N Y N Y 0 5
Y N Y N 0 10
Y N N Y 1 18
N N N Y 0 7
N N Y N 1 9
N Y N N 0 10
Y N N N 0 24
N N N N 0 72
Table II.8: Voting detail on majority-roll bills in 106th House.
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voted for the special rule that enabled the Democrats’ victory.
2.5 Summary
As the standing rules were settling into their modern form (in 1880), the Rules Com-
mittee was rising to prominence through the creative use of special rules to consider
bills outside of the usual procedures. Today, nearly every important bill has a special
rule, and most have rules that very carefully structure the consideration of amend-
ments. This has resulted in the virtual elimination of second-order amendments and
the development of very simple amendment trees.
However, even with its control of the Speaker and Rules Committee, the majority
party is unable to protect all of its interests. Although the majority has the ability to
take away most of the minority party’s rights and privileges, the minority can often
find a few friends in the majority to help. Many times these will be moderates, but
on occasion both extremes will unite against the middle to control policy, reflecting
the many dimensions of disagreement between and within the parties.
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A Key Vote Bills
The following tables provide some detail on the key vote bills that form the data set for this chapter.
The main unit of analysis is the special rule, and thus bills that never reach the floor of the House
are excluded. The columns and abbreviations used are as follows.
KV Bill A bill identified by Congressional Quarterly as having a “key vote”.
HR House of Representatives Bill
HJR House Joint Resolution (requires Senate and President’s signature)
HCR House Concurrent Resolution (requires Senate)
HRes House Resolution (requires only the House)
S Senate Bill
SJR Senate Joint Resolution
SCR Senate Concurrent Resolution
Nomination Henry Foster, Jr., nomination for Surgeon General
Impeach Clinton impeachment trial (in Senate). (The impeachment resolution passed the
105th House.)
Treaty Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty
#KV Number of key votes in the (H)ouse and (S)enate.
Rule House special rule used to consider the key vote bill (or a bill that was substituted for it).
Some bills received multiple special rules, usually one that provided an open rule and then a
second adopted when too many amendments were offered.61
HRes The bill was considered under a special rule proposed by the House Rules Committee
and approved by a simple majority of the House.
Suspension The bill was considered under a “motion to suspend the rules and pass”, re-
quiring a 2/3-majority but permitting only limited debate.
UC Order The bill was considered under a special order, approved by unanimous consent.
Rule Type The type of the special rule, using the Rules Committee classification system, as in
the “Survey of Activities.” In addition, most rules also provided time for debate, identified
amendments to be considered as original text (usually a committee substitute), and provided
a variety of waivers of the standing rules.
61Several bills also received a special order which allocated time for debate and then left the bill
unfinished, pending an additional order of the House. Those debate rules are not reported here.
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Open Amendments may be offered to the bill, under the “five-minute” rule in the standing
rules.
MO (Time) A modified open rule, where the total time for amending is constrained to a
few hours.
MO (Preprint) A modified open rule, where all amendments must be printed in the Con-
gressional Record in advance of consideration.
MO (Both) A modified open rule, with both a time limit and a preprinting requirement.
Structured A rule that includes a list of amendments. Only those amendments may be
considered, usually in the order listed.
Closed A rule that permits no amendments to the bill.
Amends For time-limit rules, the time allowed for amendment. For structured rules, this is the
number of (A)mendments, Secon(d)-order Amendments, and Amendments in the Nature of
a (S)ubstitute that are in order under the rule.62
House Bills The bills that are governed by the special rule. On the rare occasion that a rule
governs multiple bills, it usually provides that the Clerk will engross the bills together, before
sending them to the Senate as a single bill.63
Outcome The final status of the bill.
Law The bill (or joint resolution) became law.
Enacted The resolution passed and became effective.
Vetoed The bill was vetoed by President Clinton and the veto was not overridden.
Conf The bill passed both House and Senate, but the Conference Committee failed to resolve
their differences.
Senate The bill passed the House but died in the Senate. Many died in committee, some
failed cloture, and a few were voted down.
House The bill was voted down in the House. Note that HJR 73 in the 104th House was a
Constitutional amendment that had majority but not 2/3-majority support. The failed
bills in the 106th House all failed to gain majority support.
62Amendments in the nature of a substitute replace entire bills. Substitute amendments (that
replace entire amendments) are included with the second-order amendments. There were no amend-
ments to a substitute amendment observed.
63The only exception to the automatic instruction that the Clerk engross the bills together is HRes
101 in the 104th House, where there was a modified open rule for HR 925 and then a structured
rule for HR 9, providing for only a substitute bill including HR 925. Even in this case the Senate
would receive only one bill.
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KV Bill #KV Rule Rule Type Amends House Bills Outcome
HJR 1 1H,2S HRes 44 Structured 5S HJR 1 Senate
S 4 2S
HRes 55
UC Order
Open
Structured 4A,2S
HR 2 Law
HR 9 1H HRes 101 MO (Both) 12-hour
HR 925
HR 9
Senate
HR 1058 1H,1S HRes 105 MO (Time) 8-hour HR 1058 Law
HR 956 1H,2S HRes 109 Structured 15A HR 956 Veto
HJR 73 1H HRes 116 Structured 4S HJR 73 House
HR 4 1H,1S HRes 119 Structured 31A,3S HR 4 Veto
HR 1215 1H HRes 128 Structured 1S HR 1215 Senate
HR 961 1H HRes 140 Open HR 961 Senate
HR 1530
S 1026
2H
1S
HRes 164 Structured 55A,1d HR 1530 Veto
HR 2099 1H HRes 201 Open HR 2099 Veto
S 21 1S HRes 204 Structured 1S S 21 Veto
HR 2126
S 1087
1H
1S
HRes 205
UC Order
Open
MO (Time) 5-hour
HR 2126 Law
HR 1555
S 652
1H
1H,2S
HRes 207 Structured 6A,1d HR 1555 Law
S 440 1S HRes 224 Open HR 2274 Law
HR 927 1S HRes 225 Structured 3A,1S HR 927 Law
HR 2425 1H HRes 238 Structured 1S HR 2425 Senate
HR 2491 1H,1S HRes 245 Structured 1S HR 2491 Veto
HR 1833 2H,2S HRes 251 Closed HR 1833 Veto
HRes 250 1H HRes 268 Structured 1A,1S HRes 250 Enacted
HR 2564
S 1060
1H
1S
HRes 269 Open HR 2564 Law
HJR 122 1H HRes 270 Closed HJR 122 Law
HR 2606 1H HRes 273 Structured 1S HR 2606 Senate
HR 2854
S 1541
1H
1S
HRes 366 Structured 16A HR 2854 Law
HR 2703 2H HRes 380 Structured 16A,1S HR 2703 Law
HR 2202 1H HRes 384 Structured 31A,1d HR 2202 Senate
HR 3136 1H HRes 391 Structured 1A HR 3136 Law
S 1028 1S HRes 392 Structured 1S HR 3103 Law
SCR 57 1S HRes 435 Structured 3S HCR 178 Enacted
HR 3448
HR 1227
1H
1S
HRes 440 Structured 2A
HR 3448
HR 1227
Law
HR 3610 2H HRes 453 Open HR 3610 Law
HR 3734 1H,1S HRes 482 Structured 1A,1S HR 3734 Law
HR 1627 1H Suspension HR 1627 Law
HR 1643 1H Suspension HR 1643 Law
S 343 1S n/a n/a (1)
S 1061 1S n/a n/a (1)
S 1219 1S n/a n/a (1)
S 2056 1S n/a n/a (1)
SJR 31 1S n/a n/a (1)
Nomination 1S n/a n/a (2)
S 1936 1S n/a S 1936 (3)
(1) Never reached House. (2) Senate only. (3) Passed Senate but never left House Commerce Committee
Table II.9: Key vote bills of the 104th House (1995-1996).
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KV Bill #KV Rule Rule Type Amends House Bills Outcome
S 280 1S HRes 100 MO (Both) 5-hour HR 800 Law
HR 975 1H HRes 114 Closed HR 975 Senate
HR 4 1H HRes 120 Closed HR 4 Law
SCR 21 1H HRes 151 Closed
HR 1569
HCR 82
HJR 44
SCR 21
Senate
House
House
House
S 1233 1S HRes 185 Open HR 1906 Law
S 1059 1S HRes 200 Structured 23A HR 1401 Law
HR 1000 1H HRes 206 Structured 7A HR 1000 Law
HR 1501
HR 2122
1H
1H
HRes 209 Structured 52A,2d,2S
HR 1501
HR 2122
Conf
House
HR 2084 1S HRes 218 Open HR 2084 Law
HR 10
S 900
1H
1S
HRes 235 Structured 11A HR 10 Law
HR 1995 1H HRes 253 Structured 11A,1S HR 1995 Senate
HR 2488
S 1429
1H
1S
HRes 256 Structured 1S HR 2488 Veto
HR 417 1H HRes 283 Structured 10A,3S HR 417 Senate
HR 2436 1H HRes 313 Structured 1A,1A HR 2436 Senate
HR 2723
S 1344
1H
1S
HRes 323 Structured 3S
HR 2990
HR 2723
Conf
HR 2260 1H HRes 339 Structured 1A,1S HR 2260 Senate
S 761 1H HRes 366 Structured 1A,1S HR 1714 Law
HR 3846 1H HRes 434 Structured 1A
HR 3081
HR 3846
Senate
S 1287 1S HRes 444 Closed S 1287 Veto
HCRes 290 1S HRes 446 Structured 5S HCR 290 Enacted
S 1692 1S HRes 457 Closed HR 3660 Conf
S 2521 1S HRes 502 Open HR 4425 Law
HR 4205
S 2549
2H
3S
HRes 503
HRes 504
Structured
Structured
35A
6A,1d
HR 4205 Law
HR 4444 1H,1S HRes 510 Closed HR 4444 Law
HR 4577 2S
HRes 518
UC Order
Open
Structured 38A
HR 4577 Law
HR 8 1H HRes 519 Structured 1S HR 8 Veto
HR 4578 1H HRes 524 Open HR 4578 Law
HR 4516 1S HRes 530 Structured 3A HR 4516 Veto
HR 4680 1H HRes 539 Closed HR 4680 Senate
HR 4810 1S HRes 545 Structured 1S HR 4810 Veto
HR 4811
S 2522
1H
1S
HRes 546
UC Order
Open
Structured 40A
HR 4811 Law
HR 4762 1H Suspension HR 4762 Law
HR 4923 1H Suspension HR 4923 Senate
HR 5173 1H Suspension HR 5173 Senate
S 1593 1S n/a n/a (1)
Impeach 2S n/a n/a (2)
Treaty 1S n/a n/a (2)
S 254 1S n/a HRes 249 (3)
(1) Never reached House. (2) Senate only. (3) House refused to consider the Senate’s “revenue” bill.
Table II.10: Key vote bills of the 106th House (1999-2000).
54
Chapter III
Endogenous Rules Model
Legislatures frequently have the power to choose their own rules of operation. For
example, the U.S. Constitution explicitly establishes that within Congress “Each
House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings” (Article 1, Section 5). The House
of Representatives frequently uses this power, reconsidering its “standing” rules at
the beginning of every Congress and adopting bill-specific “special” rules frequently.
These special rules usually fit into one of a handful of templates, and generally restrict
the number and order of amendments, but otherwise leave the main parliamentary
procedure untouched (see Chapter II). The House has used special rules for over a
century, and most important bills are considered under a special rule. For exam-
ple, the FY2001 Budget Resolution and the 1893 act repealing the Sherman Silver
Purchase Act were considered under surprisingly similar rules, providing for nearly
identical amendment structures.
Example: Budget Resolution, 2000
On March 23, 2000, the House adopted House Resolution 446, providing for consider-
ation of the FY2001 budget (House Concurrent Resolution 290). After some debate,
the House would then proceed to consider amendments to HCR 290 (as amended by
the rule):
“No amendment to [the bill] shall be in order except those printed
in part B of the report of the Committee on Rules.1 Each amendment
1Namely, report 106-535.
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may be offered only in the order printed in the report, may be offered
only by a Member designated in the report, shall be considered as read,
shall be debatable for the time specified in the report equally divided and
controlled by the proponent and an opponent, and shall not be subject to
amendment. All points of order against the amendment[s] printed in part
B of the report are waived except that the adoption of an amendment in
the nature of a substitute shall constitute the conclusion of consideration
of amendments to [the bill]” (CR, March 23, 2000, p. H1291).
Thus, the House will consider, in order, five amendments in the nature of a substitute:
1. Congressional Black Caucus Substitute [Clyburn (D-SC)]
2. Congressional Progressive Caucus Substitute [DeFazio (D-OR)]
3. The Coalition’s Substitute [Stenholm (D-TX)]
4. Conservative Action Team’s Substitute [Sununu (R-NH)]
5. Democratic Substitute [Spratt (D-SC)]
Each of these substitutes will face a simple majority vote, and the first one that passes
will become the amended bill. If none of these five pass, the bill will stand. Finally,
the House will vote whether to adopt the amended bill (or keep the status quo).2
Example: Free Coinage of Silver, 1893
These sorts of special rules are not new developments, however. The bill repealing the
purchase component of the Sherman Silver Purchase Act of 1890 was considered under
a very similar rule.3 As introduced to the House, HR 1 repealed the requirement that
the Treasury purchase silver on the open market (to be coined at a 16-to-1 ratio to
2The rule was adopted by a vote of 228-194, all five substitutes were voted down and then the
bill passed by a vote of 211-207.
3See Hinds, §3204, pp. 212-213; CR, August 11, 1893, pp. 241-244; and CR, August 28, 1893, pp.
1003-1008.
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gold) but offered that anyone could have their silver coined at the Mint, at a 15-to-1
ratio.4 The special rule for considering the bill was:
“Ordered by the House. That H.R. No. 1 shall be taken up for imme-
diate consideration and considered for fourteen days. During such con-
sideration night sessions may be held, for debate only, at the request of
either side. The daily sessions to commence at 11 a.m. and continue until
5 p.m. Eleven days of the debate on the bill to be given to general debate
under the rules of the last House regulating general debate, the time to
be equally divided between the two sides as the Speaker may determine.
The last three days of debate may be devoted to the consideration of the
bill and the amendments herein provided for, under the usual five-minute
rule of the House, as in Committee of the Whole House. General leave to
print is hereby granted.
“Order of amendments: The vote shall be taken first on an amendment
providing for the free coinage of silver at the present ratio. If that fail[s],
then a separate vote to be had on a similar amendment proposing a ratio
of 17 to 1; if that fails, on one proposing a ratio of 18 to 1; if that fails,
on one proposing a ratio of 19 to 1; if that fails, on one proposing a ratio
of 20 to 1. If the above amendments fail, it shall be in order to offer
an amendment reviving the act of the 28th of February, 1878, restoring
the standard silver dollar, commonly known as the Bland Allison Act;
the vote then to be taken on the engrossment and third reading of the
bill as amended, or on the bill itself if all amendments shall have been
voted down, and on the final passage of the bill without other intervening
motions” (CR, August 11, 1893, p. 242).
That is, after 11 days of debate the House will consider, in order, six amendments
to the bill (which includes free coinage at 15-to-1 and no purchase requirement),
4This bill was part of the bimetalism debates in the late 1800s. “16-to-1” means that silver and
gold coins will be sized so that sixteen ounces of silver coins have the same value as as one ounce of
gold. 15-to-1 would be good for people who own silver (since it makes for small weight, high value,
silver coins) while 20-to-1 would be good for people who own gold.
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stopping if any of them pass:
1. Free coinage at 16-to-1 (the present ratio) and no purchase requirement.
2. Free coinage at 17-to-1 and no purchase requirement.
3. Free coinage at 18-to-1 and no purchase requirement.
4. Free coinage at 19-to-1 and no purchase requirement.
5. Free coinage at 20-to-1 and no purchase requirement.
6. Free coinage at 16-to-1 and restoration of 1878 Bland-Allison purchase require-
ments.
Each of these amendments will face a simple majority vote, and the first one that
passes will be the ratio in the amended bill. If none of these pass, then the ratio in
the bill will be 15-to-1. Finally, the House will vote whether to adopt the amended
bill (or keep the status quo).5
1 Endogenous Rules Model
The model considered here reflects the structure of those special rules, as well as
House procedure more generally. For most important bills the House adopts a rule
specific to that bill that specifies which amendments will be considered, and in which
order. Each amendment is debated and voted on before the next is considered, and
once an amendment passes no other amendment may change it.
Thus, the basic structure of the model here is very simple: first, the legislature
chooses its “rules” (which agenda game it will play); then it plays the chosen game to
select an outcome. The model is truly defined by the set of available agenda games,
however. For this chapter, this set will include agendas where the first motion to pass
is adopted.6 In particular, it will be assumed that there are two policies identified
5The rule was adopted by voice vote (after a 219-99 roll call vote on the previous question), all
six amendments were voted down by large margins, and the bill passed by a vote of 239-108.
6Ordeshook and Schwartz (1987) refer to these as sequential-elimination agendas.
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exogenously (a bill and a status quo). The agenda games are then represented as
a sequence of legislators who may each propose an amendment (in response to the
bill and status quo). When an amendment is adopted, it will replace the bill and
end the amending stage. After an amendment is adopted (or all proposals have
failed), the amended bill is considered against the status quo and the winning policy
is implemented.
1.1 Legislators’ Preferences
The only actors in the model are members of a legislature, N = {1, . . . , n}. The
legislature collectively chooses an outcome from a set X.7 Each legislator i ∈ N is
assumed to have rational preferences i over outcomes (with i and ∼i being the
strict preference and indifference relations).8 Legislators are assumed to optimize
with respect to these preferences, so that they will choose actions that lead to the
most-preferred available outcomes.
1.2 Model Structure
The model proceeds in two stages, given two identified outcomes: the status quo
SQ ∈ X and the bill B ∈ X. First, the legislature chooses which agenda game it
wishes to play. In order to avoid imposing excessive structure on this stage, this
will be considered as a social choice problem. This analysis will largely focus on
Condorcet winning rules (which would defeat any other rule) and rules in the top
cycle (see Chapter I).
The second stage of the model consists of the agenda games. A (length k) agenda
game is identified by an ordered sequence of proposers [p1, . . . , pk] ∈ Nk. First, p1
will propose a point x1 ∈ X ∪{∅} and the legislature will vote whether to adopt x1 or
continue.9 If they continue, then p2 has an opportunity to propose, and so on. This
7These will also be referred to as bills, amendments, or policies.
8Legislators have no explicit preferences over “rules,” only over final outcomes. i is a weak
order on X, demonstrating transitivity and completeness.
9If x1 = ∅, so that p1 has not made a real proposal, the legislature is assumed to continue.
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proceeds until a proposal xj is adopted or all k proposals are rejected and B stands
unamended. The legislature then chooses between this outcome (xj or B) and the
status quo, with the winner being implemented.
Assume that when the legislature votes on y over x, legislator i ∈ N casts vote
vi ∈ {y, x}. The legislature aggregates these votes using a decision rule defined by a
set of decisive coalitions, D ⊂ 2N .10 If ∃C ∈ D such that vi = y, ∀i ∈ C, then the
legislature chooses y over x. It is assumed that D has nice properties, mainly that
adding voters to a winning coalition will not change the outcome. Any supermajority
or weighted quota rule (with the quota being at least half of the total weight) could be
used as the decision rule. Eventually it will be assumed that an n-member legislature
(with n odd) uses simple majority rule, DM = {C ⊂ N : |C| > n/2}.
The agenda games will each be analyzed using pure strategy, subgame-perfect
equilibria.
Definition 2 A pure strategy, subgame-perfect equilibrium of the length-k agenda
game [p1, . . . , pk] is a pair (x
∗, v∗) such that
• Every proposer pj ∈ {p1, . . . , pk} proposes x∗j optimally, given (x∗, v∗).
• Every voter i ∈ N votes vji (xj, B) ∈ {xj, B} optimally, given (x∗, v∗), for every
stage j ∈ {1, . . . , k} and every proposal xj ∈ X.
• Every voter i ∈ N votes vji (xj, SQ) ∈ {xj, SQ} optimally, given (x∗, v∗), as-
suming that proposal xj defeats B at stage j.
• Every voter i ∈ N votes vBi ∈ {B, SQ} optimally, given (x∗, v∗), assuming that
all proposals fail.
This equilibrium concept includes two key assumptions:
• Legislators correctly predict all future actions.
10⊂ represents the weak subset relation, where A ⊂ B =⇒ (a ∈ A =⇒ a ∈ B). Thus, 2N = {C ⊂
N} includes N .
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• Legislators cannot credibly promise to take future actions against their self-
interest.
For the results that follow, it will be assumed that the equilibrium is reasonable,
in that even non-pivotal voters are satisfied with the outcome. This is similar to
Farquharson’s collective equilibrium, explained as
“There is no person or group with both the will and the power to make
a change” (Farquharson 1969, 52).
Definition 3 (x∗, v∗) is a weakly coordinated, pure strategy, subgame-perfect equilib-
rium if it is a pure strategy, subgame-perfect equilibrium and voting outcomes would
not be changed if all voters with strict preferences voted strategically.
In a weakly coordinated equilibrium, voting leads to the same outcomes as if voters
with strict preferences could coordinate. That is, there is no group of voters who
could change their votes and all be strictly better off without there being another
group that could change their votes to return to the original (strictly better for them)
outcome.11
For example, consider a legislature that uses a supermajority rule for voting, so
that D consists of all subsets larger than q. In a weakly coordinated equilibrium, if
only q − m legislators vote for y over x (so that x is chosen), then it must be the
case that the margin of victory, m, plus the number of legislators who vote for y but
would prefer the outcome resulting from x is larger than the number who vote for x
but would prefer the outcome resulting from y. Similarly, if q+m legislators vote for
y over x, then {m+#|x−voters who want y|} > {#|y−voters who want x|}.
This weak coordination does not prevent non-pivotal voters from casting votes
against their strategic interests, it merely requires that their numbers be adequately
balanced. This equilibrium concept allows for the “hip-pocket” or “if-you-need-me”
votes that appear to be prevalent in the House (e.g., King and Zeckhauser, 2003).
11This also means that a legislature with the ability to immediately “reconsider” a vote should
never do so.
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Consideration of the endogenous rules model will proceed in three distinct phases.
First, general predictions of the agenda games are derived and the existence of equi-
libria will be proven for a wide class of preferences. These equilibrium properties will
then be used to examine the endogenous rule game. Finally, in Chapter IV, the gen-
eral predictions of the endogenous rule model will be used to more fully characterize
equilibria for several typical applications.
1.3 Agenda Game Equilibria
Examination of the agenda games proceeds by backwards induction, starting from
the final votes and proceeding to earlier votes and proposals. A peculiar definition is
needed to begin, however.
Definition 4 Define ςi(y, x) : X × X → X as the (deterministic) sincere voting
function of legislator i, with ςi(y, x) ∈ {y, x}, ∀y, x ∈ X, and
ςi(y, x) =
 y if y i xx if x i y .
Note that ςi(y, x) is assumed to make a deterministic choice from {y, x}, and so must
incorporate some yet-to-be-defined “tie-breaker” rule when y ∼i x.12 That is, it is
assumed that every time a legislator is asked to choose between y and x she will make
the same choice, even if indifferent between the alternatives.
Definition 5 Define the (sincere) “win set” of x ∈ X to be
Wς (x) = {y ∈ X : {i ∈ N : ςi(y, x) = y} ∈ D} ∪ {x}.
That is, y ∈ Wς (x) means that y would defeat x if legislators were voting sincerely
according to the functions ς.
12ςi is a complete antisymmetric extension of i.
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Proposition 6 For the length-k agenda game with proposers [p1, . . . , pk] beginning
with bill B and status quo SQ, such that B ∈ Wς (SQ), define x∗k+1 ≡ B. Then
any weakly coordinated, pure strategy, subgame-perfect equilibrium (x∗, v∗) must have
identical subgame outcomes to the equilibrium (x̂∗, v̂∗) that satisfies the following:
1. Legislators vote sincerely (and thus strategically) in the last vote (with amended
bill x).
v̂∗i (x, SQ) = ςi(x, SQ)
v̂∗i (B, SQ) = ςi(B, SQ)
2. Legislators vote strategically in the jth stage (after xj has been proposed), as-
suming that rejection of xj will result in x̂∗j+1.
v̂∗i (xj, B) =
 xj if ςi(xj, x̂∗j+1) = xjB if ςi(xj, x̂∗j+1) = x̂∗j+1
3. ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, proposer pj’s equilibrium proposal strategy is the most-preferred
amendment that will pass.
x̂∗j ∈ Wς
(
x̂∗j+1
)
∩Wς (SQ)
x̂∗j pj y, ∀y ∈ Wς
(
x̂∗j+1
)
∩Wς (SQ)
4. ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, if pj has an opportunity to propose, then x̂∗j will be adopted as
the final outcome.
5. x̂∗1 is adopted as the final outcome.
Proof : See the appendix to this chapter (results 16 and 18).
This proposition establishes that, if equilibria exist, a set of “nice” equilibria
can achieve all equilibrium outcomes. These equilibria have all voters with strict
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preferences voting strategically, proposers always proposing winning amendments,
and the game ending with the first proposal being adopted.
Both the voting functions ςi, the proposing functions may require an indifference-
breaking rule to be fully identified. However, any pure strategy, subgame-perfect
equilibrium of an agenda game must have this structure. Further, even this general
framework provides some predictions, as reflected by Proposition 10.
1.4 Existence of Equilibrium
Pure strategy, subgame-perfect equilibria of the agenda games exist fairly generally. If
the set of outcomes is finite or legislators have preferences over outcomes represented
by continuous utility functions, ui : Rm → R, then equilibria exist.
Theorem 7 If legislators’ preferences are continuous and their better-than sets are
bounded,13 then, for any status quo, bill, and agenda, there exists a weakly coordinated,
pure strategy, subgame-perfect equilibrium (x∗, v∗) of the agenda game.
Proof : Theorem 22 in the appendix to this chapter.
The proof constructs a particular equilibrium, where
• Voters with strict preferences vote strategically.
• Indifferent voters vote for the new amendment over the bill.
• Proposers always make winning proposals.
1.5 Endogenous Rules Stage
With these results it is possible to consider which particular agenda game the leg-
islature will choose to play. Define x[p1,...,pk] to be an equilibrium outcome of the
agenda game with proposers [p1, . . . , pk]. This leads to the definition of each individ-
ual legislator’s preferences over rules, based on the resulting outcome. Legislator i
13So that {y ∈ X : y i x} is compact for all x and i.
64
can compare any two sequences of proposers, [P1] and [P2], using:
[P1] i [P2] ⇐⇒ x[P1] i x[P2] .
To choose a particular agenda game, the legislature needs to aggregate these indi-
vidual preferences. As earlier, assume that the legislature uses a decision rule based
on decisive coalitions, DR. It is assumed that it is easier to change the rules than to
adopt an amendment. This may seem like an unusual assumption, but it does appear
to be true for many legislatures. For example, the House of Representatives can, and
regularly does, change its rules with a simple majority vote. On the other hand, for
a bill to pass into law it must generally must be accepted by the relevant committees
and subcommittees, as well as by the House. Similarly, the U.S. Senate requires a
supermajority of 60 (out of 100) to pass legislation over a filibuster. However, the Re-
publican leadership of the 109th Senate contends that the rules governing filibusters
can be changed with a simple majority vote (of 50 Senators).
Definition 8 For any agenda games P1 6= P2 define two choice relations . and .W :
P1 . P2 ⇐⇒ {i ∈ N : vRi (P1, P2) = P1} ∈ DR
P1 .
W P2 ⇐⇒ {i ∈ N : P1 i P2} ∈ DR.
. is the true aggregate preference relation, assuming that the legislators vote following
the not-yet-definied function vRi . .
W assumes that indifferent legislators vote for P1
over P2, providing a bound on .. Note that P1 . P2 =⇒ P1 .W P2.
The set of “winning” agendas is based on the top cycles of the legislative decision
rules. The top cycle is a useful set for this purpose, since there is no sequence of votes
on rules such that the legislature will choose to leave the top cycle. See Chapter I
and Schwartz (1972).14
14Also, as shown by Sen (1977, 56), the top cycle of . is the most-preferred indifference class of
the transitive closure of ..
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Definition 9 Define the set of available agendas to be P. The top cycle sets for the
endogenous rule stage are the smallest non-empty subsets of P such that:15
TC : P ′ 7 P (∀P ∈ TC, ∀P ′ ∈ P \ TC)
TCW : P ′ 7W P (∀P ∈ TCW , ∀P ′ ∈ P \ TCW )
Note that TC ⊂ TCW , since TCW is a candidate for TC. Further, in the usual way,
if a Condorcet winner exists then it is the unique point in the top cycle set.
Proposition 10 Assume that legislative decision making (for both rules and amend-
ments) is governed by D = DR. For every k ∈ {0, 1, . . .} and P = [p1, . . . , pk] ∈ Nk,
consider weakly coordinated, pure strategy, subgame-perfect equilibrium proposals x[P ]
with sincere voting functions ς.
The following are true ∀i ∈ N,P ∈ P:
1. Legislator i prefers his proposal (in response to x[P ]) to that alternative and to
what any other legislator j would propose in response to that alternative, so that
x[i,P ] i x[P ] and x[i,P ] i x[j,P ].
2. The legislature will always be willing to add a proposer to the front of an existing
agenda, so that [i, P ] .W P .
3. If voters use the same voting rule for rules and amendments, then the preference
for longer agendas will be strict, so that [i, P ] . P and P 7 [i, P ].
4. If voters use the same voting rule for rules and amendments and the legislature
will not adopt some rule (because it is not in the top cycle), then every rule in
the top cycle constrains its first proposer. In particular, if ∃P ′ 6∈ TC such that
all subgames of P ′ are in P, then [i, P ] ∈ TC =⇒ x[i] i x[i,P ].
Assume ui : Rm → R continuous and {y ∈ X : ui(y) ≥ ui(x)} is bounded. Fix
SQ ∈ X extreme and B ∈ Wς (SQ). If x[i,P ] is not a local satiation point, then
15See also equation (I.1).
66∣∣{j ∈ N : x[i,P ] j x[P ]}∣∣ 6∈ D and ∣∣{j ∈ N : x[i,P ] ∼j x[P ]}∣∣ ≥ 1 Thus, the indifferent
legislators are pivotal unless the proposal is an ideal point of the proposer.
Proof : (1): Corollary 19 in the appendix to this chapter.
(2-3): Proposition 20 in the appendix.
(4): Contrapositive of proposition 21 in the appendix.
The unnumbered result is from Corollary 23.
This proposition sets out a variety of findings. The first is a straightforward
property of agenda game equilibria. The second and third findings indicate that
the legislature has a general preference for longer agendas, always being willing to
add another proposer – the decisive coalition that would vote for the new proposer’s
proposal will also vote to let her make a proposal. The fourth and fifth findings are
the most important.
• If the top cycle is non-trivial (so that some rule will not be chosen), then every
agenda in the top cycle constrains its first proposer. These constraints are not
generally observable, since the first proposal should pass with certainty, but
they are important.
• Further, unless a proposer was satiated at her proposal, indifferent legislators
were pivotal in the proposal winning.
1.6 Instability Results
This section will establish certain limits on agendas that can persist in a legislature
able to choose its rules of operation. Assume that there are three legislators, two who
have been identified as possible proposers and one who only votes. The proposers
could represent majority and minority party leaders, a committee chairman and a
party leader, or any other pair. The legislature then chooses among the agenda
games with these particular proposers. Further, assume that the legislature operates
by majority rule, so that DM is the decisive set for both amendments and rules.
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Proposition 11 Assume N = {lA, lM , lL}, P = {∅, [lA], [lM ], [lA, lM ]}, and D =
DR = DM = {{lA, lM}, {lA, lL}, {lM , lL}, {lA, lM , lL}}. I.e., the legislature is composed
of three members, operates under majority rule, and is permitted to choose among
four agendas: no amendments, an amendment from lA, an amendment from lM , or
amendments from lA then lM .
Label as B, A, M , and AM the outcomes of pure strategy, subgame-perfect equi-
libria for agendas in P. Assume further that each of these outcomes is unanimously
preferred to the status quo, SQ.
If the top cycle of the endogenous rules stage is TC = {[lA, lM ]}, then legislators’
preferences over outcomes must satisfy:
A lA AM lA M, A lA B
M lM B, M lM A, AM lM A
AM lL A.
Assume that i is a continuous preference relation on the outcome set X ⊂ Rm,
∀i ∈ N . If A, AM , and M are not local satiation points for their proposers, then
every legislator’s preference order is completely specified (up to indifference):
A lA AM lA B lA M
M lM AM lM A ∼lM B
B lL M lL AM lL A.
Note that the top cycle can be small only if the legislator excluded from the agenda
games (lL) prefers the original bill B to any proposal that is made.
Proof : Theorem 24 in the appendix to this chapter.
This proposition places tight bounds on preferences in the situation where a two-
amendment agenda is preferred to shorter agendas, particularly if the equilibrium
proposals are not satiation (ideal) points. Chapter IV considers a special case of this
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model, with preferences based on a multi-dimensional spatial model, in more detail.
2 Summary
A two-stage legislative model, with both endogenous rules and endogenous agenda
formation, provides a variety of interesting predictions for legislative behavior. With
abstract preferences, outcomes are “as if” legislators vote strategically and all propos-
als pass. Further, the legislature has a clear preference for longer agendas. However,
there is a potential for the longest agendas to be defeated by very short agendas. In
fact, only one one-amendment agenda needs to be checked against each long agenda
to verify whether the legislature’s top cycle is global or restrictive. Identify a longest
possible agenda (where no legislator can be added as a new first proposer); if the first
proposer in that agenda prefers the resulting outcome to the one which would occur
if he were the only proposer, then the legislature will prefer a closed rule to that long
agenda. If this is true for all longest agendas, then the top cycle involves all possible
agendas.
With the addition of very mild assumptions on preferences, an equilibrium of
the endogenous agenda game is guaranteed to exist. Further, in equilibrium only
“indifferent” legislators will be pivotal.
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A Proofs
A.1 Assumptions
Assumption (A1) The set of decisive amendment coalitions, D, is monotonic and proper.
C ∈ D =⇒ C ′ ∈ D, ∀C ⊂ C ′ ⊂ N
C ∈ D =⇒ N \ C 6∈ D, ∀C ⊂ N
Assumption (A2) D is strong.
C 6∈ D =⇒ N \ C ∈ D, ∀C ⊂ N
Note that majority rule, DM , satisfies (A1) and (A2).
Assumption (A3) The voting function ςi is weakly biased towards its first argument, in that
{i ∈ N : ςi(y, x) = x} ⊂ {i ∈ N : ςi(x, y) = x}, ∀y, x ∈ X
The first argument is always the new proposal. The proposer, being able to anticipate voting
functions, would be able to give a small token to a voter in order to break her indifference in favor
of the proposal. In a continuous world, these tokens can be arbitrarily small, leading to this sort of
result in the limit.
Assumption (A4) The set of decisive rule coalitions, DR, is assumed to be monotonic and proper.
Further, D ⊂ DR.
It is also of note that assumptions (A2) and (A4) imply that DR = D.
The following three assumptions are used to prove existence of equilibria.
Assumption (A5) The outcome space, X ⊂ Rm, is a closed subset of the m-dimensional Euclidean
space.16
Assumption (A6) {y ∈ X : {i ∈ N : y i SQ} ∈ D} is bounded.
Assumption (A6) is satisfied in many contexts. Under circumstances like a multi-dimensional spatial
model, where x becomes very bad as ‖x‖ → ∞, {y ∈ X : y i SQ} is bounded for each legislator.
On the other hand, in an “economic” model where more is better, there will usually be a bound on
16X = Rm does satisfy (A5).
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X constraining the total amount available. For instance, in a divide-the-dollar game every player
wants as much money as possible, so that preferences are not bounded in Rm, but outcomes must
lie in a (bounded) simplex.
Assumption (A7) Every legislator’s preferences are continuous.
{y ∈ X : y i x} is closed ∀i ∈ N,x ∈ X
A.2 Equilibrium Concept
Definition 12 Define Vk to be the set of valid (individual) voting strategies of a length-k agenda
game. That is
Vk =
[{x,B}X × {x, SQ}X]{1,...,k} × {B,SQ}X
with a generic element vi ∈ V being
vi = ((v
j
i (x,B), v
j
i (x, SQ))j∈{1,...,k}, v
B
i ).
vi ∈ Vk identifies how legislator i will vote on every possible proposal at every proposal stage
j ∈ (1, . . . , k), how she will vote on every possible amended bill from every stage, and how she will
vote on the unamended bill if all proposals fail. Thus, Vk is the complete strategy space of a voter,
just as X ∪ {∅} is the complete strategy space of a proposer.
Definition 13 A pure strategy subgame-perfect equilibrium of the length-k agenda game [p1, . . . , pk]
is a pair (x∗, v∗) ∈ [X ∪ {∅}]{1,...,k} × VNk such that
• Every proposer pj ∈ {p1, . . . , pk} optimizes:
Outcome[(∅, . . . , ∅, x∗j , x∗j+1, . . . , x∗k), v∗]
pj Outcome[(∅, . . . , ∅, xj , x∗j+1, . . . , x∗k), v∗]
∀xj ∈ X ∪ {∅}.
• Every voter i ∈ N optimizes, for every stage j ∈ {1, . . . , k} and every proposal xj ∈ X:
Outcome[(∅, . . . , ∅, xj , x∗j+1, . . . , x∗k), v∗]
i Outcome[(∅, . . . , ∅, xj , x∗j+1, . . . , x∗k), (vji (xj , B), v∗)]
∀vji (xj , B) ∈ {xj , B}.
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• Every voter i ∈ N optimizes if all proposals fail:
Outcome[(∅, . . . , ∅), v∗]
i Outcome[(∅, . . . , ∅), (vBi , v∗)]
∀vBi ∈ {B,SQ}.
• Every voter i ∈ N optimizes if proposal xj defeats B at stage j. If C = {i′ ∈ N :
vji′
∗
(xj , SQ) = xj} is such that C \{i} 6∈ D and C∪{i} ∈ D, then xj i SQ =⇒ vji (xj , SQ) =
xj and SQ i xj =⇒ vji (xj , SQ) = SQ.
The Outcome(x, v) function is defined, by backward induction, to be the policy that is implemented
by the given strategies.
Note that there are only 3k+1 types of proper subgames in the length-k agenda game: proposer
pj is asked to make a proposal, proposer pj has made a proposal, the legislature has adopted proposer
pj ’s proposal, and the legislature has rejected all proposals. If pj is asked to make a proposal, then
the previous j− 1 proposals were rejected or were not made (∅), but this distinction is unimportant
as it has no further effect on future play.
Definition 14 The coordinated voting function of the pure strategy, subgame-perfect equilibrium
(x∗, v∗) is
v̂ji
∗
(x, y) =

x if Outcome(x) i Outcome(y)
y if Outcome(y) i Outcome(x)
vji
∗
(x, y) if Outcome(x) ∼i Outcome(y)
v̂Bi
∗ =

B if Outcome(B) i Outcome(SQ)
SQ if Outcome(SQ) i Outcome(B)
vBi
∗ if Outcome(B) ∼i Outcome(SQ)
∀i ∈ N, j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, x ∈ X, y ∈ {B,SQ}.
Definition 15 (x∗, v∗) is a weakly coordinated, pure strategy, subgame-perfect equilibrium if it is a
pure strategy, subgame-perfect equilibrium and ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, x ∈ X, y ∈ {B,SQ}
{i ∈ N : v̂ji
∗
(x, y) = x} ∈ D ⇐⇒ {i ∈ N : vji
∗
(x, y) = x} ∈ D
and
{i ∈ N : v̂Bi ∗ = B} ∈ D ⇐⇒ {i ∈ N : vBi
∗
= B} ∈ D.
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A.3 Equilibrium Properties
Definitions 4 and 5 define sincere voting functions ςi and sincere win sets Wς (x).
Proposition 16 For the length-k agenda game with proposers [p1, . . . , pk] beginning with bill B and
status quo SQ, such that B ∈ Wς (SQ),17 define x∗k+1 ≡ B. Then, under assumption (A1), any pure
strategy, subgame-perfect equilibrium (x∗, v∗) where all proposers would make a passing proposal18
and voting is strategic and consistent with ςi must satisfy the following:
1. Legislators vote sincerely (and thus strategically) in the last vote (with amended bill x), using
vji
∗
(x, SQ) = ςi(x, SQ) and vBi
∗
= ςi(B,SQ).
2. Legislators vote strategically in the jth stage (after xj has been proposed), using
vji
∗
(xj , B) =
 xj if ςi(xj , x∗j+1) = xjB if ςi(xj , x∗j+1) = x∗j+1 .
3. ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, proposer pj’s equilibrium proposal strategy satisfies
x∗j ∈
{
x ∈ Wς
(
x∗j+1
) ∩Wς (SQ) : x pj y,∀y ∈ Wς (x∗j+1) ∩Wς (SQ)} .
4. ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, if pj has an opportunity to propose, then x∗j will be adopted as the final
outcome.
5. x∗1 is adopted as the final outcome.
Proof : (1,2): By assumption. Given this behavior, the Wς (·) win sets are correct and proposers
can use them when optimizing.
(3,4): The proposers’ problems are solved by induction, from the last proposer. To begin with,
however, consider the situation faced by an arbitrary proposer pj . Under the induction hypothesis,
all later proposers are playing equilibrium strategies such that x∗j+1 will be implemented if pj+1
has an opportunity to propose (i.e., (3) and (4) are true for j + 1, . . . , k). Then there are only two
possible outcomes of the agenda game if pj has an opportunity to propose: xj and x∗j+1. Under
equilibrium voting, xj can be implemented only if xj ∈ Wς (SQ) and xj ∈ Wς
(
x∗j+1
)
. Otherwise,
the legislators will vote (strategically) to reject xj and keep B (viz. x∗j+1). x
∗
k+1 ≡ B satisfies the
induction hypothesis since (if all proposals are rejected) B ∈ Wς (SQ) will be implemented.
17If B 6∈ Wς (SQ) then x∗k+1 = SQ works.
18I.e., with x∗j ∈ Wς
(
x∗j+1
) ∩Wς (SQ)
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(5): Finally, the first proposer, p1, will always have an opportunity to propose, so x∗1 will be
proposed and be adopted.
Corollary 17 Consider the length-k agenda game with proposers [p1, . . . , pk] beginning with bill B
and status quo SQ. Then, under assumption (A1), any weakly coordinated, pure strategy, subgame-
perfect equilibrium (x∗, v∗) must have an associated equilibrium (x∗, v̂∗) where v̂∗i is consistent with
some ςi, ∀i ∈ N .
Proof : Since (x∗, v∗) is weakly coordinated, ∃v̂∗ that is outcome-equivalent to v∗, with
v̂ji
∗
(x, y) =

x if Outcome(x) i Outcome(y)
y if Outcome(y) i Outcome(x)
vji
∗
(x, y) if Outcome(x) ∼i Outcome(y)
.
∀i ∈ N,x ∈ X, y ∈ {B,SQ}, j ∈ {1, . . . , k} define
ςi(Outcome(x), Outcome(y)) =

Outcome(x) if O(x) i O(y)
Outcome(x) if O(x) ∼i O(y) and vji
∗
(x, y) = x
Outcome(y) if O(y) i O(x)
Outcome(y) if O(x) ∼i O(y) and vji
∗
(x, y) = y
.
ςi can then be extended to X ×X in any manner consistent with strict preferences.
Corollary 18 Consider the length-k agenda game with proposers [p1, . . . , pk] beginning with bill B
and status quo SQ. Then, under assumption (A1), any weakly coordinated, pure strategy, subgame-
perfect equilibrium (x∗, v∗) must have an associated equilibrium (x̂∗, v̂∗) where all proposers would
make a passing proposal and voting is consistent with ςi. x̂∗ satisfies the following:
x̂∗k+1 =
 B if B ∈ Wς (SQ)SQ otherwise
x̂∗j =
 x∗j if x∗j ∈ Wς
(
x̂∗j+1
)
∩Wς (SQ)
x̂∗j+1 otherwise
∀j ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
Proof : Use the previous result to identify v̂∗i and ς.
Identify pj′ as the last proposer who does not propose a passing amendment in equilibrium:
j′ = max{j ∈ {1, . . . , k} : x∗j 6∈ Wς
(
x∗j+1
) ∩Wς (SQ)}.
Consider the subgame starting with the proposal by pj′ . Under the equilibrium, pj′ does not propose
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(or proposes a losing amendment), so that pj′+1 has an opportunity to propose. Thus, x∗j′+1 will be
adopted.
Since pj′ is optimizing, it must be that x∗j′+1 pj′ x ∀x ∈ Wς
(
x∗j′+1
) ∩ Wς (SQ). Since x ∈
Wς (x), x∗j′+1 would be a passing amendment for pj′ . Thus, x̂∗j′ = x∗j′+1 is another equilibrium.
Iterate until all proposers make passing proposals.
Corollary 19 Assuming (A1), in any weakly coordinated equilibrium of a length-k agenda game if
pj makes a passing proposal then the following are true:
1. ∀x ∈ Wς (SQ), x pj x∗j =⇒ x 6∈ Wς
(
x∗j+1
)
,
2. {i ∈ N : x∗j i x∗j+1} ∈ D ,
3. {i ∈ N : x∗j i SQ} ∈ D, and
4. {i ∈ N : x∗j+1 i x∗j} 6∈ D.
Proof : (1): weak axiom of revealed preference (WARP).
(2) and (3): Monotonicity of D.
(4): Properness of D.
Definitions 8 and 9 define the true legislative choice function ., the weak legislative choice
function .W , and their associated top cycles.
Proposition 20 Under assumptions (A1) and (A4), for any sequence of proposers P and any
p0 ∈ N ,
[p0, P ] .W P.
Further, with the additional assumption (A2),
x[p0,P ] p0 x[p0] =⇒ ∅ .W [p0, P ].
Under assumptions (A2) and (A4), if vRi = ςi,
19 then
[p0, P ] . P, P 7 [p0, P ], and
x[p0,P ] p0 x[p0] =⇒ [p0, P ] 7 ∅.
With the addition of assumption (A3),
x[p0,P ] p0 x[p0] =⇒ ∅ . [p0, P ].
19So legislators use the same tie-breaking rule for voting over amendments and rules.
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Proof : Note that {i ∈ N : x[p0,P ] i x[P ]} ∈ D ⊂ DR. Thus, [p0, P ] .W P .
If p0 strictly prefers x[p0,P ] to x[p0], then it must be the case that x[p0,P ] is not acceptable when
p0 is the only proposer (WARP). That is, x[p0,P ] 6∈ Wς (B). Thus, {i ∈ N : x[p0,P ] i B} 6∈ D. By
strongness of D, this means that {i ∈ N : B i x[p0,P ]} ∈ D = DR. Thus ∅, the agenda game with
no proposers (that results in B), is .W -preferred to [p0, P ].
If legislators use the same voting function for rules and amendments then the coalition with
ςi(x[p0,P ], x[P ]) = x[p0,P ] will vote for p0’s amendment at the beginning of the [p0, P ] agenda and
will also vote for [p0, P ] over P , being decisive in both cases. If, in addition, D is strong then
{i ∈ N : ςi(x[p0,P ], B) = x[p0,p]} 6∈ D is identical to {i ∈ N : vRi ([p0, P ], ∅) = [p0, P ]} 6∈ DR.
Under assumption (A3), when legislators may be biased in favor of the first option, {i ∈ N :
vRi ([p0, P ], ∅) = ∅)} ∈ DR =⇒ {i ∈ N : vRi (∅, [p0, P ]) = ∅)} ∈ DR.
Proposition 21 Assume (A1), (A2), and (A4). Assume also that the set of available agendas is
monotonic, so that [i, P ] ∈ P =⇒ P ∈ P. Then,
P = [p1, . . . , pk] ∈ TCW and x[P ] p1 x[p1] =⇒ TCW = P.
Assume also (A3) and vRi = ςi. Then,
P = [p1, . . . , pk] ∈ TC and x[P ] p1 x[p1] =⇒ TC = P.
Proof : x[P ] p1 x[p1] =⇒ ∅ .W P =⇒ ∅ ∈ TCW if P ∈ TCW . Since subagendas are in P and
[p, ·] .W [·],
[p′1, . . . , p
′
k′ ] ∈ P =⇒ [p′1, . . . , p′k′ ] .W [p′2, . . . , p′k′ ] .W . . . .W [p′k′ ] .W ∅.
Thus, P ∈ TCW =⇒ P ⊂ TCW .
The same logic applies to TC, given assumptions so that ∅ . P .
A.4 Existence of Equilibrium
Theorem 22 Assume (A1), (A5), (A6), and (A7). ∀k ∈ {0, 1, . . .}, SQ ∈ X, B ∈ X, and
P = [p1, . . . , pk] ∈ Nk there exists a weakly coordinated, pure strategy, subgame-perfect equilibrium
(x∗, v∗) of the agenda game P where all proposers make winning proposals and with ς∗i (y, x) = y if y i xx if x i y .
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Proof : (Voting strategies): For every i ∈ N choose a function ςi : X ×X → X such that20
ςi(y, x) ∈ {y, x}, ∀x, y ∈ X,
{y ∈ X : ςi(y, x) = y} is closed, ∀x ∈ X, and
{y ∈ X : y i x} ⊂ {y ∈ X : ςi(y, x) = y} ⊂ {y ∈ X : y i x}, ∀x ∈ X.
ςi exists since {y ∈ X : y i x} is closed (i is continuous) and {y ∈ X : y i x} ⊂ {y ∈ X : y i x}.
ς∗i is an acceptable sincere voting function. Define
Wς∗ (x) = {x} ∪ {y ∈ X : {i ∈ N : ς∗i (y, x) = y} ∈ D}
= {x} ∪
⋃
C∈D
⋂
i∈C
{y ∈ X : ς∗i (y, x) = y}.
Since {y ∈ X : ς∗i (y, x) = y} is closed and n is finite, Wς∗ (x) is closed ∀x ∈ X. Further, by X ⊂ Rm
and (A6), Wς∗ (SQ) is compact.21 Thus, Wς∗ (x) ∩Wς∗ (SQ) is compact ∀x ∈ X.
(Proposing strategies): Since preferences are continuous, there exist continuous utility functions
ui : X → R that represent i.22 ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , k} define µj : X ⇒ X by
µj(z) = {x ∈ Wς∗ (z) ∩Wς∗ (SQ) : x pj y,∀y ∈ Wς∗ (z) ∩Wς∗ (SQ)}
= {x ∈ Wς∗ (z) ∩Wς∗ (SQ) : upj (x) ≥ upj (y),∀y ∈ Wς∗ (z) ∩Wς∗ (SQ)}.
By the Berge Maximum Theorem, µj(z) is non-empty for all z ∈ X.23 Define x∗k+1 = B if B ∈
Wς (SQ) and x∗k+1 = SQ otherwise. ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , k} choose any x∗j ∈ µj(x∗j+1).
With these x∗j , define voting strategies, v
∗
i , in a manner consistent with ς
∗, as follows, ∀i ∈
N, j ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}, (x1, . . . , xk) ∈ Xk, x ∈ X:
v∗i (xj , B) =
 x if ς∗i (xj , x∗j+1) = xjB if ς∗i (xj , x∗j+1) = x∗j+1
v∗i (x, SQ) = ς
∗
i (x, SQ).
20A is the closure of A ⊂ X in X.
21Heine-Borel Theorem, e.g., Aliprantis and Border (1999) Theorem 3.19. This is the only point
where (A5) and (A6) are used. Thus, the result can be extended to non-Euclidean outcome spaces
so long as Wς∗ (SQ) is compact.
22E.g., Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995) Proposition 3.C.1.
23E.g., Aliprantis and Border (1999) Theorem 16.31.
77
Corollary 23 Assume (A1), (A5), (A6), and (A7). For any k ∈ {0, 1, . . .}, SQ ∈ X, B ∈ X, and
P = [p1, . . . , pk] ∈ Nk, consider any weakly coordinated, pure strategy, subgame-perfect equilibrium
(x∗, v∗).
If x∗j is not a local satiation point for pj in X
24 and SQ is sufficiently extreme25 then
{i ∈ N : x∗j i x∗j+1} 6∈ D and
{i ∈ N : x∗j i x∗j+1} ∈ D.
Proof : In equilibrium, pj must be optimizing, so that x∗j is pj -optimal in Wς
(
x∗j+1
) ∩ Wς (SQ).
As x∗j is not a local satiation point, in every neighborhood of x
∗
j , ∃x pj x∗j . Note that x 6∈
Wς
(
x∗j+1
) ∩Wς (SQ), so ∃i ∈ N such that
ςi(x∗j , x
∗
j+1) = x
∗
j and ςi(x, x
∗
j+1) = x
∗
j+1
OR
ςi(x∗j , SQ) = x
∗
j and ςi(x, SQ) = SQ.
Since i is continuous, {y ∈ X : y i z} is open for every z ∈ X. In particular, this means that
x∗j i x∗j+1 =⇒ x i x∗j+1 and
x∗j i SQ =⇒ x i SQ.
Since SQ is extreme, it must be the case that x∗j ∼i x∗j+1 and ςi(x∗j , x∗j+1) = x∗j .
Consider now the hypothetical situation where i’s voting is given by ςi except when considering
x∗j over x
∗
j+1, where x
∗
j+1 is chosen. If this does not change the equilibrium, repeat the previous
analysis until some i∗ is important enough to affect the equilibrium.26 Since the equilibrium is not
sensitive to how an individual votes unless that voter is pivotal, it must be that i∗ is pivotal, so
{i ∈ N : ςi(x∗j , x∗j+1) = x∗j} ∈ D and
{i ∈ N \ {i∗} : ςi(x∗j , x∗j+1) = x∗j} 6∈ D.
The result is then proven with assumption (A1).
24i.e., in every open neighborhood Nx∗j ⊂ X of x∗j , ∃x ∈ Nx∗j such that x pj x∗j .
25Such that x∗j i SQ, ∀i ∈ N, j ∈ {1, . . . , k}. For the multi-dimensional spatial model (with
circular preferences), this can be defined in terms of the yolk (McKelvey 1986). If the last proposal
is Pareto optimal, then any status quo that lies at least 2 ∗ k yolk-radii outside of the Pareto set is
dominated by every amendment that can beat the last proposal in a k-step agenda.
26D is proper and monotonic, so that the empty coalition N \N is not decisive and the equilibrium
must change before {i ∈ N : ςi(x∗j , x∗j+1) = x∗j} = ∅.
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A.5 Instability Results
Theorem 24 Assume N = {lA, lM , lL}, P = {∅, [lA], [lM ], [lA, lM ]}, and D = DR = DM =
{{lA, lM}, {lA, lL}, {lM , lL}, {lA, lM , lL}}.
Label as B, A, M , and AM the outcomes of pure strategy, subgame-perfect equilibria for agendas
in P with voting rules based on ς∗i (y, x) =
 y if y i xx if x i y . Assume further that each of these
outcomes is unanimously preferred to the status quo, SQ.
If the top cycle of the endogenous rules stage is TC = {[lA, lM ]}, then legislators’ preferences
over outcomes must satisfy:
A lA AM lA M, A lA B
M lM B, M lM A, AM lM A
AM lL A.
Assume that i is a continuous preference relation on the outcome set X ⊂ Rm, ∀i ∈ N . If
A, AM , and M are not local satiation points for their proposers and A lA B, AM lA M , and
M lM B, then:
A lA AM lA B lA M
M lM AM lM A ∼lM B
B lL M lL AM lL A.
Proof : Note that subgame perfection implies that lM ’s proposal under the [lA, lM ] agenda must be
the same as her proposal under the [lM ] agenda, M . As shown earlier in Corollary 19, in equilibrium
it must be the case that
A lA B A lA M |i ∈ N : A i B| ≥ 2
M lM B M lM A |i ∈ N :M i B| ≥ 2
AM lA M |i ∈ N : AM i M | ≥ 2.
Since [lA, lM ] is the only agenda in the top cycle, it must be the case that
|i ∈ N : B i AM | ≤ 1 and
|i ∈ N : A i AM | ≤ 1.
By WARP, AM ∈ Wς∗ (B) =⇒ A lA AM , so AM lM A and AM lL A. Collecting these proves
the first result.
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If preferences are continuous and the proposals are not local satiation points, then at least one
legislator must be indifferent on each vote and no more than one can have a strict preference in each
direction. Since proposers are assumed to have a strict preference for their proposal (A,AM , or M),
the other two legislators must both weakly prefer the continuation alternative (B,M, or B). Since
B lL M and M lL AM , transitivity and TC = {[lA, lM ]} imply AM lA B and AM lM B.
Further, B lL A so that A ∼lM B. Finally, transitivity strengthens some weak preferences to
A lA M , M lM A, and M lL A.
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Chapter IV
Applications of the Endogenous
Rule Model
The endogenous rule model developed in Chapter III assumes that legislators have
abstract, very general, preferences. These legislators are provided with a bill B and
then choose among a set of sequential elimination agendas P before using the chosen
agenda to amend the bill. In this way, it might be considered a model of special
rules in the House of Representatives, where the House chooses a rule to govern
consideration of a particular, identified, bill.
Many of the models of policy choices (and preferences) commonly used in political
science are special cases of the preferences assumed in the endogenous rule model.
Three typical models will be examined in more detail, to determine what rules and
outcomes could result from a legislature considering those sorts of problems. The first
model is a distributive or “divide-the-dollar” game where legislators are determining
how to divide a pie, each wanting the largest share possible. The second and third
models are “spatial” games where legislators are choosing a policy that will apply to
everyone, such as a public good (or the size of the pie for a later distributive game).
The second model considers a one-dimensional policy space, where all legislators
can agree on a left-right ordering of the potential policies but disagree as to which
particular policy is best. For example, the legislature might need to divide a fixed
budget between “guns” and “butter.” The third model considers a multi-dimensional
policy space, where there are several issues to be decided. Perhaps the legislature
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needs to divide a fixed budget among three or more options; perhaps they need to
choose budgets for guns and butter, but the total is not fixed.
1 Divide-the-Dollar Game
Distributive issues, where each legislator cares only about what they receive and not
what others receive, are the basis of many models, such as Baron and Ferejohn (1989).
Assume that the legislature N = {1, . . . , n} operates under a supermajority q
rule (so that winning coalitions are those with at least q members, for n
2
< q < n).
Assume n ≥ 3 so that q is well-defined. Assume that the outcome space is X =
{(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ [0, 1]n :
∑n
i=1 xi ≤ 1} and preferences are given by utility functions
ui(x) = xi (so that legislators care only about their share of x. Let the status quo be
(0, 0, 0) and note that x i SQ for every x ∈ X and i ∈ N (thus, the status quo is
irrelevant).
Proposition 25 The top cycle of the endogenous rules game is generally global in the
divide-the-dollar setting. In particular, assume the set of feasible agendas, P, is non-
empty and satisfies (∀i ∈ N, k ∈ {0, 1, . . .}, P ∈ Nk) [i] ∈ P =⇒ ∃j ∈ N st [i, j] ∈ P
and [i, P ] ∈ P =⇒ [P ] ∈ P. Then, for almost all bills B ∈ X, TC = P.1
Proof : See the appendix to this chapter.
If a legislature is facing a divide-the-dollar problem, the endogenous rule model
is unable to make a prediction about which specific agenda will be used (so long as
a two-amendment agenda is in order). However, the model does make predictions
about the outcomes that could be implemented. Namely, the only outcomes that
can implemented are the original bill, B, and amended bills where n − 1 legislators
receive either 0 or their share of the original bill while the remaining legislator takes
everything else. Thus, where this model applies, it predicts that distributive bills
will either not be amended or will result in the complete exploitation of the excluded
members.
1In fact, the agenda top cycle is global for all bills in the interior of X.
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Kalandrakis (2005) considers the divide-the-dollar problem in a different institu-
tional environment, but ultimately reaches the same conclusion. He allows for random
recognition of proposers and endogenous stopping2 (as opposed to the fixed order and
fixed length here), but finds that every outcome in X is an equilibrium of some recog-
nition rule. Thus, Riker’s (1980) inheritance problem occurs and the top cycle over
recognition rules will be global.
Kalandrakis’s model can be viewed as a model for the House, once it has decided
to use an “open” rule for considering a distributive bill. The model here may be a
better model for the House, once it has decided to use a “restrictive” rule and now
needs to determine which particular restrictive rule it wants to use. This suggests
that any bill that receives a restrictive rule and is amended must either be an extreme
bill (excluding benefits from those who vote against it) or not be a distributive bill.
Thus, given the data in Chapter II that restrictive rules are more common than open
rules on important bills, this model may predict outcome better than Kalandrakis’s
model.3
2 One-Dimensional, Single-Peaked Preferences
The one-dimensional policy space is probably the most widely used model in political
science. The median voter theorem (e.g., Downs 1956 and Black 1958) is the most
fundamental, but one can also look to the Romer-Rosenthal (1978, 1979) setter model,
Krehbiel’s (1998) pivotal politics model, and many others. This setting is widely used
because it is one of the few environments where a Condorcet winner does exist, at
the median ideal point.
The one-dimensional setting is also implicitly used in general political discourse,
where terms like left, center, and right or liberal, moderate, and conservative are used.
It is assumed that someone might like conservatives most (and liberals least), liberals
2That is, a proposer can move to stop amending (like the previous question) or can propose an
amendment.
3Of course, the Appropriations Committee has privilege to bring any of its bills to the floor under
the (open) standing rules, in which case Kalandrakis is more applicable.
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most (and conservatives least), or moderates most. They will not like moderates
least, however.
To develop the one-dimensional model, assume that X = R and each legislator
i ∈ N has an ideal point x∗i ∈ X with single-peaked (continuous) preferences such
that: x < y ≤ x∗i or x > y ≥ x∗i =⇒ y i x. Assume that the n-person legislature
(n odd) uses majority rule, so that winning coalitions are those with more than n
2
members. Then identify a median legislator M as a legislator whose ideal point
satisfies |{i ∈ N : x∗i ≤ x∗M}| > n2 and |{i ∈ N : x∗i ≥ x∗M}| > n2 .4
Proposition 26 The top cycle of the endogenous rules game is generally not global
in the one-dimensional setting, with (at least) the closed rule being excluded. In
particular, assume the set of feasible agendas, P is non-empty and define the set of
possible proposers, P ∗ = {j ∈ N : ∃P ∈ P st j proposes in P}.
• If ∃j ∈ P ∗ such that |{i ∈ N : x∗j i B}| > n2 , identify ˆ as the Condorcet
winner among {x∗j : j ∈ P ∗}. Then TC = {P ∈ P : ˆ proposes in P}, and the
possible outcomes are x∗ˆ and I(x
∗
ˆ ) such that |{i ∈ N : I(x∗ˆ ) i x∗ˆ}| < n2 and
|{i ∈ N : x∗ˆ i I(x∗ˆ )}| < n2 .
• Otherwise, TC = P, and the possible outcomes are B and I(B) such that
|{i ∈ N : I(B) i B}| < n2 and |{i ∈ N : B i I(B)}| < n2 .
Note that M ∈ P ∗ implies that the only possible outcome is the median ideal point,
x∗M . Further, unless all moderate legislators are prohibited from ever proposing, the
top cycle excludes the null agenda (or closed rule).
Proof : See the appendix to this chapter.
If the legislature is facing a one-dimensional policy problem and its general par-
liamentary rules allow any legislator to propose, then the endogenous rules model
predicts that the legislature will not adopt any agenda that prohibits the median
legislator from proposing. In particular, unless there is an ex ante prohibition on the
median proposing, the legislature should never adopt a closed rule.5 Further, the set
4There may be multiple median legislators, but they will all have the same ideal point.
5Unless the bill is already at the median legislator’s ideal point.
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of possible outcomes is very small, even when some legislators can never propose. To
this end, the endogenous rules model predicts policy stability and a limited range of
agendas used.
3 Multi-Dimensional Spatial Model
While the one-dimensional spatial model is widely used in political science, the multi-
dimensional model is less used. The one-dimensional model can be used to make
definite predictions (median voter results), but the multi-dimensional model is gener-
ally unable to make informative predictions, as shown by Plott (1967), McKelvey
(1976,1979), and Schofield (1978). Even so, there is a large literature trying to
use a multi-dimensional model to rationalize legislative voting patterns (e.g., DW-
NOMINATE scores from Poole and Rosenthal 1997).
Some scholars have examined this model under particular institutional settings in
an attempt to make predictions (e.g., Shepsle 1979). Banks and Gasmi (1987) and
Krehbiel and Meirowitz (2002) have both examined a two-dimensional endogenous
agenda model (i.e., where legislators propose amendments), which forms the basis
of this section. Imposition of a specific agenda structure may lead to a prediction,
but different agendas will lead to different outcomes, undermining this predictability.
The endogenous rules model addresses this concern, by ensuring that the legislature
is choosing the agenda structure with full knowledge of what policy will result.
For tractability, assume that the legislature consists of three players, labeled as
lA, lM , and lL.
6 Assume that X = Rm and that the legislators have ideal points
(p∗A, p
∗
M , p
∗
L) and utility functions Ui(x) = ui(‖x− p∗i ‖), where ui : R → R is a
strictly decreasing function of the Euclidean distance between x and i’s ideal point.
If {p∗A, p∗M , p∗L} are co-linear, this is effectively a one-dimensional model, as above.
If the ideal points are not co-linear, they all lie in a single plane; without loss of
6Or, equivalently, these can be three similarly-sized voting blocs. Each group needs to always
vote together (even when indifferent), and no group can be decisive on its own. The labels were ini-
tially chosen to represent the (A)mendment and (M)otion to recommit proposers and the remaining
(L)egislator, which may still be a useful mnemonic for interpreting the families of agendas that will
be considered. As will be revealed by the proof, another interpretation is (M)oderate.
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Figure IV.1: Bills in B1 and B2 result in the [lA, lM ] two-amendment
agenda being a Condorcet winner.
generality assume that m = 2. Note that the Pareto set is the convex hull (triangle)
of {p∗A, p∗M , p∗L}. Assume that the status quo, SQ, is so extreme that it does not
matter. Further assume that the bill, B, is in the Pareto set.
Proposition 27 The top cycle of the endogenous rules game is global for some bills
and selective for other bills in the three-player multi-dimensional spatial model setting.
In particular, assume the set of feasible agendas, P, consists of all length-2 (and
shorter) agendas. Then TC = P unless the bill B lies in regions B1 or B2 of
Figure IV.1, when the [lA, lM ] two-amendment agenda is the Condorcet winner of the
endogenous rules stage.
Proof : See the appendix to this chapter.
If the top cycle excludes any agenda from the set of length-2 agendas P , then
TC(P) = {[lA, lM ]} so the rule adopted provides that the last amendment is offered
by the most moderate legislator while the first amendment is offered by the legislator
most in agreement with the moderate. Further, this will occur only when the bill
B is close to the extreme legislators, lA and lL. On the other hand, if the given bill
is moderate, then the top cycle of the endogenous rules game includes all feasible
agendas.
Since outcomes are so dependent on the location of the bill, it is interesting to
consider where B comes from. For example, if legislator lA were allowed to choose
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B before the legislature chose its (special) rules, then lA could pick a bill close to p
∗
A
so that the legislature would choose [lA, lM ] as the Condorcet winning rule and the
final outcome will be very close to lA’s ideal point. On the other hand, if legislator lL
proposed a B close to his ideal point, the legislature would again choose [lA, lM ] and
the outcome will be close to lA’s ideal point (and distant from lL’s). This suggests
that lM and lL should propose moderate bills and trust that a good (for them) rule
will be chosen, while lA should propose an extreme bill to obtain a particular rule
and an outcome close to her ideal point.
4 Summary
The application of the endogenous rules model to particular models of legislators’
preferences provides some predictions about what kinds of rules a legislature will
adopt. More importantly, the model is able to predict that certain rules will not be
adopted for particular types of issues. This provides two potential methods for testing
the applicability of the model: to look for rules that are inappropriate to the (known)
issue space and to consider which issue spaces are inappropriate for the observed rule.
For distributive (divide-the-dollar) issues, the endogenous rules model is unable to
make a particular prediction as to which rules should be adopted, but outcomes are
very constrained, in that any legislator who is not included in an amending coalition
should be completely cut out of the bill. This does not seem to be consistent with the
amendment history of “pork barrel spending” bills in the House of Representatives.
With few exceptions, amendments to appropriations bills seem to add (or slightly
rearrange) funds. When a Congressman actually proposes deep cuts to a bill, it
seems to be reported in the major media.7 Thus, it appears that the House must not
7For example, “House upstart frustrates both parties,” USA Today, July 27, 1999, p. 13A, reports
on the activities of Oklahoma Representative Tom Coburn. “In May, Coburn brought the House to a
virtual standstill by threatening to attach 130 amendments to an agriculture appropriations bill that
he thought cost too much. Since then, he’s almost single-handedly forced nearly $1 billion in cuts
from the first seven spending bills the House has passed for the next fiscal year.” Even the Senate,
where he now serves, recognizes this history – the brief biography of Coburn there includes that same
quote. (See http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/senators/one item and teasers/coburn.htm
as of May 1, 2005.)
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normally consider purely distributive issues.
The endogenous rules model is able to make definite predictions with respect to
single-dimensional issues, however. In the absence of ex ante prohibitions on moderate
legislators proposing amendments, a legislature considering a one-dimensional issue
should never adopt a closed rule. This prediction is testable, to the extent that the
dimensionality of an issue can be determined, and a preliminary test does support
the hypothesis.
The House adopts special rules to govern the debate of many bills. These spe-
cial rules are classified by the Rules Committee into three large categories: open,
structured, and closed.8 This provides a fairly direct way to measure the endogenous
rule portion of the model’s prediction. The dimensionality of a bill may possibly be
inferred from the goodness of fit of an ideal point estimation technique. If most votes
on a bill are correctly predicted by a low-dimension spatial model, it seems likely
that the dimensionality of the bill is small; if the model predicts votes poorly, then
presumably the dimensionality is high.
Dimensionality should be related to, for example, the proportional reduction in
error (PRE) of DW-NOMINATE ideal point estimates. Table IV.1 reports the appro-
priately weighted descriptive statistics of PRE by type of rule in the 106th House.9
Open rules have significantly higher PRE scores than other types of rules (p-values
of 0.07 for structured, 0.16 for closed, and 0.055 combined). Structured rules have
somewhat higher PRE scores than closed rules, but the difference is not significant.
This suggests that bills with open rules have lower dimensionality than bills with
restrictive (closed and structured) rules, the effect predicted by the one-dimensional
endogenous rules model.
8Structured rules specify that only selected amendments are in order, usually making most of the
bill non-amendable, which could be interpreted as a closed rule.
9Rule classification is from 106th Survey, pp. 68-73. The data set includes all House and Senate
bills in the 106th House (1999-2000) with special rules where the bill had a final passage roll call
vote with 300 or fewer votes cast on the winning side (this is an arbitrary value, approximating
a 2/3-majority threshold). Individual bill PRE scores for final passage votes are from Poole and
Rosenthal, at http://www.voteview.com/H106RollCalls.htm. As recommended by Poole and
Rosenthal (1998, 30), PRE scores were weighted by the minority (losing) vote on the bill to find the
aggregate proportional reduction in error (APRE).
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Open Structured Closed
APRE 0.758 0.708 0.693
sd 0.161 0.247 0.213
n 21 27 11
Table IV.1: DW-NOMINATE proportional reduction in error by rule
type, 106th House, 1999-2000.
When applied to the multi-dimensional spatial model, the endogenous rules model
makes different predictions depending on the location of the given bill. For moderate
bills, the model is unable to make a prediction as to the rule that will be adopted.
For other bills (those implementing policies close to the ideal policy of the extreme
legislators), the model predicts that a particular rule should be adopted over all
others. That rule gives a moderate legislator the right to offer the last amendment
while allowing a somewhat more extreme legislator to offer the first amendment. To
the extent that political parties are composed of legislators with similar preferences,
we can label these legislators in a quite natural way:
lA The first amendment proposer represents the leadership of the majority party.
lM The final amendment proposer represents the moderates in the majority party.
lL The remaining legislator represents the minority party.
Compare this prediction to the rule that the House adopted in 1909 providing for the
post-previous-question (amendatory) motion to recommit:
Rule XVI.4: “After the previous question shall have been ordered on
the passage of a bill or joint resolution one motion to recommit shall be
in order, and the Speaker shall give preference in recognition for such
purpose to a Member who is opposed to the bill or joint resolution” (CR,
March 15, 1909, p. 22).
The rule offered the last amendment to those “opposed” to the bill, as recognized by
the Speaker, not to those in the minority party.10
10It is important not to read too much into this, however, since by 1919 the Speaker was describing
this as a minority right. See Roundtable, 1992, p. 18.
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Taken together, these results suggest that the endogenous rule model is able to
reflect some of the behavior of the House of Representatives, and it predicts that most
of the issues the House considers bear more resemblance to multi-dimensional issues
than to either single-dimensional or distributive issues.
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A Proofs
A.1 Divide-the-Dollar Game
Proof : This is a result of Proposition 10, result 4. It will be shown that i benefits from the agenda
[i, P ] (relative to [i]), and ultimately that TC = P.
Consider the situation of legislator i who is allowed to propose an amendment A∗ as an alter-
native to A. That is, if A∗ is voted down, A will be implemented. Then i’s best response proposal
A∗ will be based on forming a coalition of low-value legislators, satisfying:
A∗j = Aj j ∈ C
A∗j = 0 j ∈ (N \ {i}) \ C
A∗i = 1−
∑
j 6=iA
∗
j
for some set C ⊂ N \ {i} such that |C| = q − 1 and Aj ≤ Aj′ , ∀j ∈ C, j′ ∈ (N \ {i}) \ C. Thus,
A∗i = 1−
∑
j∈C Aj ≥ Ai and A∗j ≤ Aj , ∀j 6= i.
Without loss of generality, focus on legislator n, and sort the remaining legislators so that
0 ≤ B1 ≤ . . . ≤ Bn−1 (without placing any constraint on Bn). For agenda [n], legislator n will form
a coalition with legislators 1 through q − 1, giving each of them Bj and keeping 1 −
∑q−1
j=1 Bj for
himself.
For the agenda [n, P ] (with P 6= ∅), n is facing an alternative A. With the exception of the
previous proposer, ˆ, Aj ≤ Bj . Further, Aj0 = 0 for some legislator j0 ≥ q.11 If j0 6= n, then n can
form a coalition of legislators consisting of
{1, . . . , q − 2, j0} if ˆ ≥ q − 1
{1, . . . , q − 1, j0} \ {ˆ} if ˆ < q − 1.
Thus n keeps at least 1−∑q−1j=1 Bj+min {Bq−1, Bˆ}. If B is in the interior of X (so Bj > 0, ∀j ∈ N),
n strictly prefers the [n, P ] agenda outcome to that of the [n] agenda.
If q ≤ n− 2, then j0 6= n as there will always be a legislator with Aj = 0 (either n− 1 or n− 2)
who can be used to complete n’s coalition and obtain the result.
If q = n − 1 and Bn ≥ Bn−1 (or ˆ = n − 1 and Bn ≥ Bn−2), then n will be the only legislator
excluded from ˆ’s coalition. So, n will propose a coalition with all legislators except ˆ, offering each
coalition member Aj ≤ Bj . But then the null agenda will beat [n, ˆ, . . .] in the endogenous rule
stage, as all legislators except n will weakly prefer B to n’s proposal.
11j0 can always be one of n, n− 1, or n− 2, depending on whether ˆ = n− 1 and Bn ≥ Bn−1 or
Bn ≥ Bn−2.
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In summary, consider B in the interior of X. Then, for every [i, P ] ∈ P with P 6= ∅, either
x[i,P ] i x[i] or ∅ . [i, P ]. Assume, for the moment, that TC 6= P. Then
x[i,P ] i x[i] =⇒ [i, P ] 6∈ TC
=⇒ [P ] 6∈ TC
=⇒ . . .
=⇒ ∅ 6∈ TC.
Thus P ′ 6∈ TC for every P ′ ∈ P so that the top cycle is empty, an impossiblity. ∴ TC = P
A.2 One-Dimensional, Single-Peaked Preferences
Proof : Note that the assumption of continuous single-peaked preferences means that the individual
“better than” sets Ri(x) = {y ∈ X : y i x} are closed intervals, with one endpoint at x. Thus,
the legislative win set, W (x) is a closed interval with one endpoint at x, the other endpoint at I(x),
and includes x∗M .
W (x) = {y ∈ X : {i ∈ N : y i x} ∈ D =
⋃
C∈D
⋂
i∈C
Ri(x)
Consider the situation faced by legislator j when proposing against an alternative A that will
be implemented if j’s proposal is rejected. Assume, without loss of generality, that x∗M ≤ A. Then
j’s best response proposal is defined by:
I(A) if x∗j ≤ I(A)
x∗j if I(A) ≤ x∗j ≤ A
A if A ≤ x∗j
or, equivalently,
I(A) or A if |{i ∈ N : x∗j i A}| <
n
2
x∗j if |{i ∈ N : x∗j i A}| >
n
2
.
Thus, an agenda P will lead to the Condorcet winner in the set
{x∗j : j proposes in P} ∪ {B}
and I(·) of that point. Further, agendas in P will lead only to outcomes in {x∗j : j ∈ P ∗} ∪ {B}, so
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pL pA
pM
I
II
III
IV
Figure IV.2: Regions of Pareto set for three player 2-dimensional ex-
ample.
an agenda will be in the top cycle only if it leads to the Condorcet winner of that set. If B is not
that Condorcet winner, P ∈ P is in the top cycle only if P includes ˆ, where x∗ˆ defeats all other
points in {x∗j : j ∈ P ∗} ∪ {B}. Otherwise, no proposer will beat the bill and TC = P.
A.3 Multi-Dimensional Spatial Model
Proof : As shown by Banks and Gasmi (1987), the best response of proposer i to a point x depends
on the location of that point with respect to the hyperbola through p∗i with foci at the other ideal
points. Referring to Figure IV.2, if B lies in areas I or IV then lA’s best response A(B) will lie on
the line between p∗A and p
∗
M such that ‖B − p∗M‖ = ‖A(B)− p∗M‖. If B lies in II or III then A(B)
lies on the line between p∗A and p
∗
L so that ‖B − p∗L‖ = ‖A(B)− p∗L‖. Similarly, for B in I or II, lM
chooses M(B) to keep lL indifferent, while lA is kept indifferent for B in III or IV.
Given the best responses of the proposers, the examination of the top cycle will proceed in three
stages. Note that if P ′ ⊂ P, then P ∈ TC.(P) =⇒ P ∈ TC.(P ′). Thus, if the top cycle is global on
a subset of available agendas, the top cycle over all available agendas can be no smaller than that
subset. To this end, begin by fixing two proposers and allow both, one, or neither of them to propose
(in a fixed order). This set of agendas can then be expanded to allow these two to propose in either
order. Finally, the complete set of length-2, length-1, and closed agendas will be considered, using
the previous results.
Top cycle with two proposers in a particular order
Consider a legislature which is allowed to choose among only a small set of agendas, namely PAM =
{∅, [lA], [lM ], [lA, lM ]}. Define the outcomes of these agendas as B, A, M , and AM , respectively, so
that A is lA’s best response to B, M is lM ’s best response to B, and AM is lA’s best response to M
(by subgame perfection).
In a pure strategy, subgame-perfect equilibrium where the proposers’ ideal points are not pro-
93
pL pA
pM
B
A
M
AM
Figure IV.3: Example of a bill in region I.
pL pA
pM
B
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M
AM
Figure IV.4: Example of a bill in region IV.
posed and [lA, lM ] is the only agenda in the top cycle of PAM , Proposition 11 severely limits the
possible preferences over the outcomes. For example, it must be the case that A ∼lM B. Thus, the
bill B must lie in either region I or IV. If B lies in I, as in Figure IV.3, M lies on the p∗Mp
∗
L line (in
region III) and M ∼lL B. Then AM will lie on the p∗Ap∗L line in region I and AM ∼lL M . Note that
‖B − p∗M‖ ≤ ‖AM − p∗M‖, so that B lM AM – a contradiction with TC = {[lA, lM ]}. Thus, B must
lie in region IV, as in Figure IV.4. For B in that region, lM will propose M on the edge of region
II and lA will propose AM on the p∗Ap
∗
L edge of region I. For most bills, B lM AM , preventing the
two-amendment agenda from being stable because lM and lL will prefer the outcome of ∅ (namely
B) to that of [lA, lM ].
There is, however, a small subset of region IV, close to p∗L, where lM ’s preference ordering will
be correctly M lM AM lM A ∼lM B. An example is in Figure IV.5, indicating the equilibrium
proposals and relevant indifference curves. Note that AM lies just inside of lM ’s indifference curve
through B and A. Bills leading to the (lA, lM ) agenda are always close to p∗L, and exist if p
∗
M lies
in the region indicated in Figure IV.6. This region is bounded by the hyperplane halfway between
p∗A and p
∗
L, the parallel plane through p
∗
A, and the circle centered on p
∗
A and passing through p
∗
L.
The midpoint-boundary is related to the hyperbola shown in Figure IV.2, and is associated with a
change in the type of equilibrium. Similarly, if p∗M crosses the p
∗
A boundary then AM = p
∗
A and lA is
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Figure IV.5: A bill where the [lA, lM ] agenda beats all subagendas.
pL pA
Potential
pM points
AM > 0,A,M
Figure IV.6: Ideal points where the [lA, lM ] agenda can beat all sub-
agendas.
satiated. The remaining boundary, where ‖p∗L − p∗A‖ = ‖p∗M − p∗A‖, is associated with lA becoming
satiated when choosing A.
Thus, if the legislature is constrained to allow lA and then lM to offer amendments, allow only
one of them, or allow none of them, permitting both to propose will be the Condorcet winning rule
only if B is in a small region of the policy space.
Top cycle with two proposers in no particular order
Consider a legislature which is allowed to choose among a slightly larger set of agendas, namely
PAM,MA = {∅, [lA], [lM ], [lA, lM ], [lM , lA]}. Using the results of the previous section, there exist bills
where [lA, lM ] defeats all shorter agendas. Similarly, there are bills where [lM , lA] (with outcomeMA)
will be chosen over the shorter agendas. To identify the top cycle of PAM,MA it will be important
to consider whether one bill can satisfy both of these requirements.
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Figure IV.7: Best response partition for three player 2-dimensional
example.
Thus, assume that both [lA, lM ] and [lM , lA] defeat ∅, [lA], and [lM ], so that:
[lA, lM ] . ∅ ∅ 7 [lA, lM ] [lM , lA] . ∅ ∅ 7 [lM , lA]
[lA, lM ] . [lA] [lA] 7 [lA, lM ] [lM , lA] . [lA] [lA] 7 [lM , lA]
[lA, lM ] . [lM ] [lM ] 7 [lA, lM ] [lM , lA] . [lM ] [lM ] 7 [lM , lA].
Using Proposition 11, legislators’ preferences over the outcomes ∅, A, M , AM , and MA must satisfy:
A lA AM lA M, A lA B, MA lA M
M lM MA lM A, M lM B, AM lM A
AM lL A, MA lL M.
The geometry of the two-dimensional spatial model provides additional constraints on preferences,
due to the best response functions, as suggested by Figure IV.7. The best response sets partition
the boundary of the Pareto set into three disjoint regions where lA prefers any point in her best
response set to any point in either lM ’s or lL’s best response set, so that
A lA M, A lA MA, AM lA M, AM lA MA.
Thus, the preferences over equilibrium outcomes are almost completely specified:
A lA AM lA MA lA M, A lA MA, A lA B
M lM MA lM AM lM A, M lM AM , M lM B
AM lL A, AM lL M, MA lL A, MA lL M.
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Using Proposition 11, if AM 6= p∗A (so that lA is not satiated there) then AM ∼lL M . Similarly,
if MA 6= p∗M then MA ∼lL A. Together these violate the transitivity of legislator lL’s preferences,
and thus it must be the case that at least one of AM or MA is a satiation (ideal) point. Assume,
without loss of generality, thatMA is a satiation point for lM . Then, becauseM lM MA, it must be
the case that M =MA = p∗M . Hence, it cannot be the case that [lM ] 7 [lM , lA] while [lM , lA] . [lM ],
for these have identical outcomes.
Thus, if the legislature is allowed to choose among agenda trees with either, both, or neither lA
and lM proposing an amendment, in any order, then at least one of them will always propose their
ideal point. This greatly simplifies the calculation of the top cycle of PAM,MA, as reflected below.
Top cycle with up to two amendments
Consider a legislature which is allowed to choose among all two-amendment agendas, namely
P =
 ∅, [lA], [lM ], [lL], [lA, lA], [lA, lM ], [lA, lL],[lM , lA], [lM , lM ], [lM , lL], [lL, lA], [lL, lM ], [lL, lL]
 .
Identify the equilibrium outcomes as before, with AM being the outcome of [lA, lM ] while A is the
outcome of [lA]. To identify the top cycle of P it will be important to consider whether any two-
amendment agenda can be a Condorcet winner. Assuming that the top cycle of P excludes some
agenda, Proposition 10, result 4, reveals that [lA, lA] 6∈ TC(P) or AA = A = p∗A, so that [lA, lA]
cannot be a Condorcet winner over all other agendas.
Without loss of generality, consider [lA, lM ] as the exemplar. At a minimum, it must be that
[lA, lM ] is the Condorcet winner in PAM , so that
[lA, lM ] . ∅ ∅ 7 [lA, lM ]
[lA, lM ] . [lA] [lA] 7 [lA, lM ]
[lA, lM ] . [lM ] [lM ] 7 [lA, lM ].
The previous section established that M = MA = p∗M in this case, so that the bill must lie in
region B1 or B2 in Figure IV.1. Then A, AL, and AA lie in region B2; L, LA, and LL lie in region
B1; and M = MA = ML = MM = p∗M . Thus, AM beats every other equilibrium outcome, and
TC(P) = {[lA, lM ]}. Regions B1 and B2 will exist only if ‖p∗L − p∗A‖ ≥ ‖p∗L − p∗M‖ ≥ ‖p∗A − p∗M‖.
Fixing p∗L and p
∗
A, these inequalities are satisfied in the region depicted in Figure IV.8. Generically,
for almost any set of ideal points (p1, p2, p3) there is a unique labeling of the proposers as lA, lM ,
and lL that satisfies the inequalities.
97
pL pA
Potential
pM points
TCHPL=AM
Figure IV.8: Ideal points where the [lA, lM ] agenda is a Condorcet win-
ner over all other length-2 (and shorter) agendas.
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Chapter V
Endogenous Standing Rules
The endogenous rule model developed in Chapter III assumes that the bill is chosen
outside of the modeled legislative process, so that the legislature is choosing a special
rule for the bill. This chapter looks at a particular extension of the model which
allows for the rules to be chosen prior to the bill being identified. This will permit
the development of a model of the standing rules of a legislature. The model predicts
that the legislature will choose a set of rules remarkably similar to those of the U.S.
House of Representatives, including a role for legislators with extreme preferences.
The standing rules model consists of three major stages:
Recognition Rule The set and order of proposers will be chosen by the legislature
by majority rule (considering the top cycle).
Legislative Rules A specific agenda structure will be chosen by the legislature by
majority rule (considering the top cycle).
Agenda Game The legislature will play the chosen agenda game, with proposers
identified by the recognition rule. The bill will be proposed as part of the agenda
game. The solution concept will be pure strategy, subgame-perfect equilibrium.
1 Five-Player Model
It is assumed that the legislature consists of five members, {A,B,C,D,E}, and is
choosing policies from X = R2. The legislators have ideal points p∗A, . . . , p∗E ∈ X
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Figure V.1: Ideal points for five player 2-dimensional example.
and utility functions Ui(x) = ui(‖x− p∗i ‖), where ui : R→ R is a strictly decreasing
function of the Euclidean distance between x and i’s ideal point. It is assumed that the
ideal points form a regular pentagon and the legislators are labeled as in Figure V.1.
The best response function of a proposer is identified by Proposition 28.
Proposition 28 Consider the situation faced by a legislator (say A) who is allowed
to make an amendment proposal, x. Assume that if x earns at least three of the
five legislators’ votes, then x is implemented; otherwise an alternative, sq, will be
implemented. In this case, A will propose one of the following six points.
A’s IP: A’s ideal point, p∗A
B  AB: x on AB such that ‖x− p∗B‖ = ‖sq − p∗B‖
C  AC: x on AC such that ‖x− p∗C‖ = ‖sq − p∗C‖
D  AD: x on AD such that ‖x− p∗D‖ = ‖sq − p∗D‖
E  AE: x on AE such that ‖x− p∗E‖ = ‖sq − p∗E‖
BE Flip: x such that ‖x− p∗B‖ = ‖sq − p∗B‖ and ‖x− p∗E‖ = ‖sq − p∗E‖ .
The particular point proposed depends on the location of sq, as indicated in Fig-
ure V.2. Define BRA(sq) to be the best response of A to the alternative sq.
Proof : See the appendix to this chapter.
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BE Flip
C->AC
D->AD
E->AE
B->AB
Figure V.2: Best response partition for five player 2-dimensional exam-
ple, with legislator A proposing.
1.1 Agenda Game Equilibria
With the best response function identified for an arbitrary continuation outcome, it
is now reasonable to examine the agenda structures that the legislature can consider.
The motions that are permitted are based on the House’s rules, with there being a
potential for as many as four proposals being offered. The full-length agenda game
will be labeled as SAMB, with proposers (BP,AP,MP ):
S The bill proposer BP proposes a “motion to suspend” policy xS ∈ X. If at least
four legislators vote for xS that policy is implemented; otherwise the game
continues.
B The bill proposer BP then chooses a “bill” policy xB ∈ X.
A The amendment proposer AP proposes an “amendment” policy xA ∈ X. If at
least three legislators vote for xA that policy is implemented; otherwise the
game continues.
M The motion to recommit (MTR) proposer MP proposes a “motion to recom-
mit” policy xM ∈ X. If at least three legislators vote for xM that policy is
implemented; otherwise xB is implemented.
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Note that the SAMB game could be modeled as the [BP,AP,MP,BP ] agenda
considered previously, with a sufficiently bad exogenous starting point. There are
two major differences, however.
• The first amendment (the suspension motion) has a supermajority requirement.
• The final amendment (the bill) is credibly committed to early in the process.
The other possible agenda structures eliminate one or more of the stages, so that
the legislature will eventually choose one from PL, defined as
PL = {SAMB, SAB, SMB, SB,AMB, AB, MB, B} .
Proposition 29 The pure strategy, subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes of agenda
structures in PL for the proposers (BP,AP,MP ) are as follows.1
1. If the bill proposer is A, then B and SB lead to outcome p∗BP = p∗A. If the bill
and amendment proposers are both A, then AB, AMB, SAB, and SAMB lead
to p∗A for any MTR proposer.
2. If the bill proposer is A and amendment proposer is B, then AB leads to the
point B in Figure V.3. AMB leads to the points labeled BA through BE,
depending on the identity of the MTR proposer. SAB and SAMB lead to
outcomes on the AC line where C is indifferent to the subgame outcome.
3. If the bill proposer is A and amendment proposer is C, then AB leads to the
point C in Figure V.4. AMB leads to the points labeled CA through CE,
depending on the identity of the MTR proposer. SAB and SAMB lead to
outcomes where B and D are indifferent to the subgame outcome (i.e., outcomes
are reflected across the BD line).
The outcomes of theMB and SMB agendas and agendas with amendment proposers
D or E are derived similarly.
1Since the ideal points are symmetric, these are solved, without loss of generality, assuming that
the bill proposer is A and the amendment proposer is one of A, B, or C.
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Figure V.3: Outcomes of AB and AMB games with bill proposer A,
amendment proposer B, and MTR proposer as specified.
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Figure V.4: Outcomes of AB and AMB games with bill proposer A,
amendment proposer C, and MTR proposer as specified.
Proof : (1): Since there is no status quo, if A is the only proposer the outcome will be
p∗A. If some other legislator is the MTR proposer, then A can choose a bill sufficiently
bad that p∗MP will be proposed (if the MTR stage is reached). Then p
∗
A will defeat
p∗MP in the amendment stage, with one legislator indifferent.
(2,3): The results for AB are derived from examination of the range of the best
response function for the amendment proposer BRAP (X) = {BRAP (x) : x ∈ X}.
The bill proposer, A, will be able to choose a bill xB ∈ X such that the resulting
amendment xA A y, ∀y ∈ BRAP (x).
The results for AMB are derived from examination of the range of the second-
order best response function BRAP (BRMP (X)) = {BRAP (BRMP (x)) : x ∈ X}.
The bill proposer, A, will be able to choose a bill xB ∈ X such that the resulting
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amendment xA A y, ∀y ∈ BRAP (BRMP (x)).
The results for SAB and SAMB are derived by examining the best response of
the suspension proposer, A, to the subgames AB and AMB, respectively. If the
amendment proposer is B, then the four-member coalitions that can agree to change
the outcome are those that exclude A or B. Since A is proposing the coalition, B
will be excluded from the suspension coalition and A will choose a proposal where C
is indifferent. If the amendment proposer is C, then the possible coalitions exclude B
or C. A will choose a proposal where C is excluded while B and D are indifferent.
1.2 Selection of Endogenous Legislative Rules
Given the results of Proposition 29, it is possible to determine the majority-rule top
cycle of the legislative rules stage for each fixed set of proposers. Note that, just as in
Chapter III, the legislature will always approve adding a motion to suspend the rules
to the agenda, since four of the five legislators prefer the suspension proposal to the
alternative.
Proposition 30 The majority rule relation . over agendas in PL leads to the top
cycles TC.(PL) as follows for each set of proposers (BP,AP,MP ):
(A,A,A) =⇒ TC.(PL) = PL
(A,A,¬A) =⇒ TC.(PL) = {SMB}
(A,B,A), (A,E,A) =⇒ TC.(PL) = {SAMB, SAB}
(A,B,E), (A,E,B) =⇒ TC.(PL) = {SMB, SAMB, SAB}.
All other agendas with BP = A result in TC.(PL) = {SAMB} .
Even though the multi-dimensional spatial model setting provides for a large pref-
erence cycle over policy outcomes, for almost all sets of proposers there is a Condorcet
winner among the agenda structures.
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1.3 Selection of Endogenous Recognition Rules
The existence of Condorcet winners at the legislative rule stage allows the set of
outcomes associated with each set of proposers to be identified, so that the legislature
can choose among the recognition rules. Define the set of possible recognition rules
to be
PR = {(BP,AP,MP )|BP = A and AP,MP ∈ {A,B,C,D,E}}.
That is, the bill proposer is fixed to be legislator A but any legislator can be the
amendment or MTR proposer.
Theorem 31 The five-player endogenous recognition and legislative rule game with
bill proposer A makes the following equilibrium predictions.
• The set of potentially chosen recognition rules is exactly those recognition rules
that lead to the SAMB legislative rule.
TC.(PR) = {(BP,AP,MP )|TC.(PL) = {SAMB}}
• The only legislative rules chosen in equilibrium are SAMB, the rules providing
for motions to suspend the rules, amend, and recommit.
• The set of chosen outcomes is fairly moderate, as shown in Figure V.5.
Note that the prohibited sets of proposers are those where proposal power is concen-
trated, so that the bill proposer A is also the amendment proposer or the amendment
proposer is adjacent to BP and the MTR proposer is either BP or adjacent to BP .
1.4 Summary
A model of an endogenous process for adopting the standing rules of a legislature
predicts significant stability, even in an environment where majority rule provides
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Figure V.5: Outcomes in the top cycle of the endogenous rule game
with fixed bill proposer A.
little guidance for choosing policy outcomes. The model developed here finds that
the legislature will always choose to use the same legislative rules, and thus that these
could be the standing rules of the legislature. There is a majority rule cycle over the
exact identity of the legislators who can make amendment proposals, but there is
a pattern in those who can be excluded. The excluded sets of proposers all satisfy
two criteria: (1) all proposers are adjacent to the bill proposer and (2) if anyone
makes multiple proposals, they are the bill proposer. Thus, any set of proposers
that the legislature chooses will either have diverse preferences or will concentrate all
amendment power in a single legislator other than the bill proposer.
The model’s predictions are broadly consistent with the rules of the House of
Representatives. The standing rules of the House provide for the three equilibrium
motions. The House also provides that the motion to recommit is reserved for the
minority party. To the extent that members of a party have similar preferences and
the majority party controls the access of bills to the floor,2 a member of the minority
party should have an ideal point distant from that of the member responsible for the
bill. The model also has the interesting feature that the motion to recommit is vital
for the equilibrium but is not used. In the House, the motion to recommit appears
to be a matter of concern (e.g., Roundtable), but motions to recommit almost never
pass.3
2As predicted by Cox and McCubbins (2004).
3See Cox, Den Hartog, and McCubbins (2004).
106
A Proofs
A.1 Best Response Function
Proposition 28 in the main text provides the solution to a basic policy proposal game that is used
extensively in solving the full legislative game. This basic game is a five-player analogue to the Banks
and Gasmi (1987) three-player, one-amendment game. Compare Figure V.2 with their Figure 7, p.
143.
The equilibrium concept used is subgame-perfect equilibrium (which in this context is effectively
a Stackelberg equilibrium, Banks and Gasmi 1987, 135). At each stage of the game, the strategies
continuing from that point are equilibrium strategies. To ensure equilibrium existence, the legislators
are presumed to vote strategically (taking into account the results of future votes) and, if indifferent
between two proposals, they vote for the later proposal.4 Then, legislator A faces the problem of
choosing the best response to the alternative sq, given that strategic voting will follow. This means
that A is choosing the point in the win set (the points that will beat sq in the voting stage) that is
closest to her ideal point.
As legislator A is considering which bill to propose, she must consider which winning coalition
will support her bill. Any set of three legislators forms a winning coalition, every winning coalition
contains at least three legislators, and, by proposing bill = sq, A will (weakly) prefer her best
response to the status quo; thus A will choose a winning coalition that includes at least two of the
other four legislators.
The six minimum-size winning coalitions generate a total of 12 different potential best response
bills:
A’s IP: A’s ideal point, p∗A
B  AB: x on AB such that ‖x− p∗B‖ = ‖sq − p∗B‖
C  AC: x on AC such that ‖x− p∗C‖ = ‖sq − p∗C‖
D  AD: x on AD such that ‖x− p∗D‖ = ‖sq − p∗D‖
E  AE: x on AE such that ‖x− p∗E‖ = ‖sq − p∗E‖
4Otherwise, the proposer of the later policy may want to propose a policy arbitrarily close to
someone’s indifference curve while staying off the curve. In such a case, the proposer would be
attempting to maximize over an open set. For the same reason, when considering longer agenda
games, it will be assumed that later proposers react to indifference by choosing the option preferred
by the previous proposer.
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BC Flip: x such that ‖x− p∗B‖ = ‖sq − p∗B‖ and ‖x− p∗C‖ = ‖sq − p∗C‖
BD Flip: x such that ‖x− p∗B‖ = ‖sq − p∗B‖ and ‖x− p∗D‖ = ‖sq − p∗D‖
BE Flip: x such that ‖x− p∗B‖ = ‖sq − p∗B‖ and ‖x− p∗E‖ = ‖sq − p∗E‖
CD Flip: x such that ‖x− p∗C‖ = ‖sq − p∗C‖ and ‖x− p∗D‖ = ‖sq − p∗D‖
CE Flip: x such that ‖x− p∗C‖ = ‖sq − p∗C‖ and ‖x− p∗E‖ = ‖sq − p∗E‖
DE Flip: x such that ‖x− p∗D‖ = ‖sq − p∗D‖ and ‖x− p∗E‖ = ‖sq − p∗E‖
SQ: Status quo, sq .
By definition, A’s ideal point is preferred by A to any other point, so A will propose it if enough
support can be found. Similarly, since the status quo is always available, A’s overall best response
must be weakly preferred to the status quo; the status quo will be chosen only if no other potential
best response can be supported.
Since a contract curve defines the Pareto optimal points for the involved parties and circular
preferences lead to straight-line contract curves, the point x in AB such that ‖x− p∗B‖ = ‖sq − p∗B‖
will be preferred by A to any other point on B’s indifference curve. Similar logic will apply to the
points on AC, AD, and AE.
These observations take care of most of the pairwise comparisons between the potential best
responses. The remaining cases fall into three classes, where W , Y , and Z are distinct legislators:
1. Compare a point on AY to a point on AZ. (Y  AY versus Z  AZ)
2. Compare a point on AY to a point where W and Z are indifferent. (Y  AY versus WZ
Flip).
3. Compare two points where pairs of legislators are indifferent.
As proven by Banks and Gasmi (1987, 136-138), case (1) is characterized a locus of sq points
where A is indifferent between the proposals, namely the hyperbola with foci at p∗Y and p
∗
Z that
passes through p∗A. A’s better choice will be to follow Z’s indifference curve to AZ if the status quo
is on the Y -side of the hyperbola; A should follow Y ’s indifference curve to AY if the status quo is
on the Z-side.
Case (2) characterizes another locus where A is indifferent between two choices. This locus is
an ellipse with foci at Y ’s ideal point and the reflection of A’s ideal point across WZ, with a major
axis of ‖p∗Y − p∗A‖.
Case (3) is easily resolved, with the indifference locus taking the form of the hyperplane between
the two reflections of A’s ideal point.
Combining the various results above leads to Proposition 28, the description of A’s best response
to sq.
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Chapter VI
Conclusion
The House of Representatives can and does regularly change its rules to suit the
whims of the majority. Through its use of special rules for important bills, adoption
of new standing rules for each Congress with additional mid-session changes on occa-
sion, and parliamentary rulings from the Speaker with frequently-used appeals to the
floor, the House is a distinctly majoritarian institution satisfying Krehbiel’s (1991)
“Majoritarian Postulate.” This makes the House an important legislature to examine
when considering the balance between the power of the majority and the rights of a
minority, between populism and liberalism.
Even in the House, Madison’s fears of “tyranny of the majority” are not entirely
realized. While the House spent much of the 1800s limiting the role of the minority
party and of individuals, the changes in the rules during this period had two main
effects. The most discussed effect was the limitation of dilatory tactics, supposedly
allowing the majority to push through its favored legislation. Prior to the widespread
use of special rules, however, dilatory tactics were not precise tools; the wasted time
likely did not affect the bill that was being debated, but instead prevented other bills
from being considered in the future.
The other major development in the House rules during the 1800s was the de-
velopment of the previous question. From the founding of the country, the previous
question could only be used to ensure that a bill be considered as it stood, cutting off
all existing and future amendments and stifling the voices of all who disagreed with
the current form of the bill. As the 1800s passed, however, the House adjusted the
109
previous question rules, providing for the consideration of existing amendments and,
in 1880, also allowing one last chance to bring the bill back to a committee for further
amendments. To this end, the adjustments in the rules during the 1800s increased
the ability of minorities to present their views and obtain a vote.
The last years of the 1800s do produce one more change in House procedure,
however: the development of special rules. The first special orders and special rules
could be adopted only by a supermajority, explicitly protecting the rights of large
minorities. The 1890s saw the development of majority-adopted restrictive rules,
however, with their potential to limit access so that only members of the majority
party could propose amendments. At the same time, the House made another major
change to the previous question by allowing one actual amendment to be proposed
before the bill can be voted on. There are suggestions that this final amendment was
generally left to the minority opposed to the bill even before this right was officially
enshrined in the rules in 1909.
The 1909 change also reveals just how deeply majoritarian the House of Represen-
tatives is. The rules were adopted through the influence of a coalition that explicitly
rejected the majority party’s proposal and then explicitly rejected the minority party’s
proposed rules. Further, the existence of this coalition indicates that the parties are
not always cohesive, providing an anecdote to support Madison’s position that large
republics prevent stable majorities.
Looking at the House of Representatives today, one sees that the majority party
does have control over most legislation but the minority party is able to obtain some of
its policies, passing several important bills and amendments every year. Further, the
majority party has not been able to restrict the activities of its members completely, so
that the majority party is occasionally undermined by one of its own members. Why
does the majority party not shut out the minority and its more extreme members?
The results of the endogenous rules model provide some explanation. An impor-
tant prediction of the model is that endogenous rules (those adopted by the legislature
itself) cannot increase the power of any member further than having control of the
only amendment. Thus, the leadership of the majority party cannot restrict the role
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of both the opposition within their party and the minority. The model also predicts
that ideologically-moderate legislators should have a role, in both the one-dimensional
and multi-dimensional settings.
Further, when applied to the question of the standing rules of the House, the model
makes a clear prediction: an ideologically diverse set of legislators should be able to
propose amendments. The model does not find that these amendments will pass,
only that the bill and other amendments will be adjusted to reflect the minority’s
influence.
Even in the most majoritarian institutions, such as the U.S. House of Representa-
tives, minorities will have a voice and will be able to affect policy because the rules of
the institution are chosen by a majority. That is, minorities have rights in majoritar-
ian institutions due solely to the fact that the institution is majoritarian, justifying
Madison’s presumption that stable majorities will not form and be able to control
the government, thus protecting liberty.
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